Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria
The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation is a military unit award issued by the government of South Korea to both South Korean and foreign military units.
Description This period was from March 9, 1967-March 31, 1968. On March 10, 1967. Seventh Air Force F-105s and F-4s bombed a new target. the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. 30 miles north of Hanoi. The Rou.mo TThis period was from March 9, 1967-March 31, 1968. On March 10, 1967. Seventh Air Force F-105s and F-4s bombed a new target. the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. 30 miles north of Hanoi. The Rou.mo Tnuuoaa bombing campaign continued with strikes against bridges. petroleum storage. cement plants. and power transformer stations near Hanoi. USAF and naval aircraft also conducted armed reconnaissance over most of North Vietnam. Missions against major supply routes from China targeted railroad yards. repair facilities. bridges. and support areas. Early in August 1967 American air attacks against the Paul Doutner Bridge in I-lanoi knocked out the center span. Poor weather in the first 3 months of I968 forced U.S. aircraft to rely almost exclusively on all-weather bombing techniques in North Vietnam; nevertheless. the Paul Doumer Bridge remained unusable most of the time. While overland routes might be interdicted. Haiphong harbor and docks still remained off limits to U.S.
pilots. A continuous flow of supplies moved through the port from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, which largely
offset North Vietnam's losses.
U.S. aircraft used electronic countermeasures and other techniques to limit the effectiveness of North Vietnam's antiaircraft defenses. North Vietnamese forces fired 55 SAM: on the average for each U.S. aircraft destroyed. To reduce the threat of a resurgent North Vietnamese Air Force. in April 1967 the United States bombed MiG bases. destroying several jet aircraft on the ground. In aerial combat during the first 6 months of 1967 (primarily in April. May. and June). U.S. pilots destroyed 54 MiGs while losing ll aircraft. But between August 1967 and February 1968. the United States lost l8 aircraft to MiGs while destroying only 5 enemy aircraft. On January 14, 1968. two MiGs shot down an EB-66 that was jamming enemy radars from an orbit 90 miles from Hanoi. The USAF subsequently used the vulnerable EB-66s in already established orbits over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin. accepting degradation of jamming to lessen the risks of aerial interception.
On April 6, 1967. the North Vietnam Anny and Viet Cong forces attacked Quang Tri. the northemmost provincial capital. 20 miles south of the demilitarized zone. To counter the offensive. on May 18 South Vietnamese and U.S. troops entered the DMZ for the first time. USAF B-52s. tactical air forces. and naval and army artillery strikes combined with Allied ground forces to destroy temporarily NVA strength in the zone. The NVA then shifted its artillery positions north of the DMZ. rebuilt its forces in the area. and on September l renewed attacks on the U.S. Marine base at Con 11tien. Immediately South of the DMZ. With forward air controllers pinpointing artillery and other targets, the USAF began an aerial attempt to destroy enemy positions. and by October 4 the North Vietnam Anny had been forced to withdraw once again.
Shortly afterward. in November 1967, U.S. forces conducting search and destroy operations in the Central Highlands encountered strong Viet Cong resistance near Dalt To. I5 miles east of the border junction between Laos. Cambodia. and the Republic of Vietnam. Tactical aircraft and B-52s provided close air support while USAF C-130s flew supplies and reinforcements to the Dak To airstrip. U.S. air-power inflicted heavy casualties. and the enemy withdrew on November 24.
In the Laotian part of the conflict. during the summer of 1967, Seventh Air Force provided extensive air support to Laotian troops battling the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces on the Plain of Jars near Luang Prabang. The I-lo Chi Minh Trail in the Laotian panhandle also came under constant attack. Between December 1967 and February 1968. Seventh Air Force pilots flew over 20.000 sorties against transportation lines in Laos and claimed destruction of more than 3.000 trucks. But the Communists continued to build up forces in Laos and Cambodia in preparation for a major offensive that began on January 21. 1968. when the NVA surrounded and laid siege to Khe Sanh. a U.S. Marine base in a valley 7 miles east of the Laotian border and 15 miles south of the demilitarized zone.... More
Other Memories
Source: http://www.366fightergroupassoc.org/GunfighterName.htm 366th Fighter Group Association Best Little Stories How the Gunfighters Got Their Name by Stanley E. Anderson, MSgt, USAF, Ret. Background. Early 1967 found the situation at the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, Danang AB, Vietnam "fluid," our mission was constantly changing as were our tactics, frustration was high and morale could have been a lot better. Our three Tactical Fighter Squadrons, the 389th, 390th and 480th, were equipped with the F-4C Phantom, at the time the premier fighter in the Air Force inventory. Our aircrews were flying a variety of missions; close air support for the US Army and Marines in South Vietnam, interdicting supply and communication lines over North Vietnam and Laos, top cover for F-105 Thunderchiefs (Thuds) bombing in North Vietnam and other special missions fragged by 7th Air Force. Our World War II forebears of the 366th Fighter Group would have been proud of us, we were some of the best "mud shovelers" in the world, strafing, bombing, laying down CBU's (cluster bomb units), etc. Strafing was performed using the SUU-16 gun pod, an electrically driven, six barrel Gatling minigun containing 1000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition with a firing rate of 100 rounds per second. For whatever reason, our aircraft losses were unacceptably high and in mid-February "Charlie" (the Viet Cong) had visited us on the ground with Russian 144mm rockets, some of which landed in one of the barracks areas on the base. When flying up North, our aircrews were hamstrung by insane Rules of Engagement; we were prohibited from flying within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi, 4 miles from the center of Haiphong and 30 miles from the China border. Furthermore we could only strike very restricted targets within 30 miles of Hanoi and 10 miles of Haiphong. Until the middle of April we couldn't even strike North Vietnamese airfields, so their jets could attack with impunity and dash back to their "safe havens." On those rare instances when our pilots did tangle with enemy aircraft, MiG-17s, MiG-19s and MiG-21s -- the smaller, lighter, more agile aircraft could turn tighter than the heavier F-4s. The Phantom's close-in air-to-air capability was further hampered by the limitations of its weapons. When the F-4 was designed in the early 1950's, the assumption was that missiles would be the weapons of the future so there was no need to include a gun on the aircraft. Enemy pilots quickly figured out that the radar beam-riding AIM-7 "Sparrow" and infrared heat-seeking AIM-9 "Sidewinder" missiles didn't arm themselves until 1500 feet after being fired so one of their favorite tactics when being chased was to allow the Phantoms to close within 1500 feet. It was not uncommon to hear pilots returning from a flight exclaim, "If I only had a brick I could have knocked him out of the air!" or something similar. On January 2, 1967, the 366th TFW participated in Operation Bolo, a MiG sweep over North Vietnam. The winter monsoon weather was bad. Our rivals, the F-4s of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing "Wolfpack" at Ubon AB, Thailand, knocked down seven MiG?s and, as luck would have it, we got none. And, of course, they got all the publicity and made the most of it. After the 8th TFW got two more MiGs on January 6th the North Vietnamese Air Force decided to stand down for training and no more MIGs were seen until early March. In March and into April, there were a few encounters, with seven MiGs being downed by F-105 Thunderchiefs from the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, Tahkli, Thailand. But it was clear from their tactics that enemy pilots didn't want to come up and play with the Phantoms. The Gun Comes of Age. Things were clearly due for a change and when they did, they changed fast. On March 20th, 1967, the 366th TFW received a new commander, Colonel (Brig. Gen. selectee) Jones E. Bolt and within a few days, a new Deputy Commander for Operations, Colonel Frederick C. "Boots" Blesse. General Bolt describes what happened next. "After a few days at Danang I scheduled myself as the element lead in a flight of four to fly top cover for the "Thuds" into Route Pack 6 (Hanoi). After a detailed briefing we went to our aircraft and I could not believe the configuration of the F-4. There was a 600 gallon centerline tank, the ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) pod on the left outboard station where we normally had a 400 gallon fuel tank; a 400 gallon tank on the right outboard station as it was supposed to be; the two Sidewinder missiles on each of the two inboard stations and of course the Sparrow missiles on the fuselage as was normal. These were the radar guided missiles we always carried on top cover or air-to-air missions. The airplane was asymmetrically loaded and it was not only unstable but would fly sideways! The only saving grace to this lousy configuration was that as soon as we hit the Black River going into North Vietnam we would jettison the centerline tank and that would make the airplane fly a little better. But if you got into a fight with the MiGs you would jettison everything except the ECM pod. We used to joke among ourselves occasionally that every time we dropped the 600 gallon centerline tank we had just dropped a Cadillac on the North Vietnamese. But the seriousness of dropping the centerline tank was that if you did not drop it in straight and level flight under 450 knots it was likely to damage the aft fuselage and the elevators on the airplane -- not a good situation over enemy territory. "After landing and debriefing I called my Ops and Maintenance people together and asked them how they came up with this configuration. Everybody said that the reason was that the ECM pod which was much smaller than the 400 gallon fuel tank and resulted in much less drag, could only be carried on the outboard station and you had to drop off the outboard fuel tank to do that. This was a case of the Maintenance people dictating to the Ops people how the airplane would be configured and it was a terrible mistake. Not only was the airplane unstable to fly that way it was terribly expensive to drop all those tanks on almost every mission. And keep in mind that we were flying 16 top cover sorties every day at the least. "I gave the problem some thought that night and talked to my squadron commanders and I just knew that there was a better way. The next morning I went down to our armament shop and got in touch with the Chief Master Sergeant who ran the place and had been running my armament shop at the F-4 Combat Crew Training Wing at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ that I commanded before going to Vietnam. I said to him, "Chief, can you make a wiring harness that can be installed on the inboard pylon that will operate the ECM pod?" He said to me, " we'll give it a try, but you know, Colonel, we cannot legally rewire the airplane without getting permission from Logistics Command because the inboard pylons are wired to carry nuclear weapons." I told my good Chief... that if he did not say anything about it I would not. I told him the reason was that we needed to do something about the configuration of the airplane to make it symmetrical and further that we could not hit a MIG-17s and few MiG-21s with the Sidewinders and only occasionally with the Sparrows and I wanted to put the (SUU-16) gun pod on the centerline station. But to do this we had to drop off two Sidewinders and install the ECM pod on the inboard pylon. This would give us a pretty stable and symmetrical airplane and we would not have to drop off those tanks on almost every mission. "The next afternoon the Chief called me to come down to his shop and we got into my staff car and went out to the F-4 he had rewired. It was a very simple wiring harness with a cannon plug on each end that could be removed in a couple of minutes and the ECM pod worked great. I flew the airplane and checked it out with our radar site at Monkey Mountain and it worked like a charm. I told him to make enough of them so we could configure enough airplanes to fly 16 sorties a day into Route Pack Six to cover the Thuds. I talked to all the Ops people and they were ecstatic that we were putting the 20 mm gun pod on the centerline and they could hit the MiG-17s and MIG-21s even though we had a lousy gun sight in the F-4C." The first hurdle overcome, Colonel Bolt called Lt. Gen. Momyer, the 7th Air Force Commander in Saigon, to inform him, "because, after all, he was my boss and would be writing my performance report and possibly my obituary." Receiving approval to move forward, Colonel Bolt turned the project over to Colonel Blesse and the Ops people to "wring out" the new configuration. Colonel Blesse put together a weapons section comprised of Lt. Col. Fred Haeffner, Majors Sam Bakke, Bob Dilger, Ed Lipsey and Jerry Robinette and Captains "Skip" Cox, Jim Craig and Bob Novak. Throughout the month of April they worked through every conceivable situation including gun problems, munitions loads, barrier procedures, chaff drops, drag chute procedures, ECM devices, bombing and air-to-air procedures. One of the major problems to be surmounted was that the F-4 did not contain a computing gun sight. Another peculiarity was that the SUU-16 gun pod was self-powered by a small turbine (known as a "rat") which was deployed in flight and worked reasonably well above 500 knots -- but only if deployed at speeds below 450 knots. If deployed at a faster speed its performance was questionable. With all the problems worked through, in early May Colonel Blesse flew down to Saigon to brief General Momyer and receive final approval. General Momyer's approval was luke warm at best and may have been influenced by a comment made by Colonel Robin Olds, the 8th Tac Fighter Wing commander, who happened to be present at the briefing and who dismissed the presentation with, "General, I wouldn't touch that thing with a ten-foot pole." But "GO" was the word and with modification of more aircraft the hunt was on. About this time, a change was made in air tactics of our strike forces. Throughout March and April, MIGCAP F-4s would sweep through the target area five minutes prior to the arrival of the flights of F-105 strike aircraft which were themselves spaced three to five minutes apart. In May this was changed so that the first flight of F-105s would be closely followed by a flight of four MIGCAP F-4s which in turn would be followed by more F-105s and finally a flight of Phantoms bringing up the rear. The first 366th F-4s carrying guns for air-to-air combat were flown into Route Pack Six starting on May 12th but for the first two days the strike aircraft went unchallenged. On May 14th, sixteen MIG's rose to take on the first wave of F-105s. Seven of the MIGs tangled with four Phantoms and two MiGs fell as the first victims of the guns wielded by Major Jim Hargrove and Capt Jim Craig. The second F-4 flight also downed a MiG with a Sparrow fired by Major Sam Bakke (see separate story, "May 14, 1967 - The Day of the Gun "). During the period April 23 - June 5, 1967 eleven MiGs were downed by aircrews of the 366th Tactical Fight Wing -- four to the 20 mm guns. No USAF Tactical Fighter Wing downed as many aircraft in such a short period in the entire eight years of the air war in the skies over Southeast Asia. As Lt. Colonel (later Major General) Bob Tanguy, 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron commander, said, "I don't think the MiGs ever figured out that the F-4s were carrying guns." And he may well be right because a review of after action reports shows that no parachutes were reported from the MiGs downed by F-4C guns. In any case after June 5th the North Vietnamese Air Force, having lost 54 aircraft in April, May and June, went into another stand down for the remainder of June and July to reevaluate their situation. At about the same time, the 366th Wing?s mission was again changed back to air-to-ground work, but not before Colonel Blesse and a group of pilots had gotten together and come up with a name and emblem by which the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing has been known ever since, "The Gunfighters." Epilogue. By October 1967, all F-4Cs in Southeast Asia, and later the F-4Ds, were reconfigured to carry the SUU-16 and SUU-23 minigun pods for air-to-air combat, including those of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing in Thailand. Perhaps General Bolt provides the best summary, "(The gun pod) was so successful that when the Air Force got control of the F-4 program from the Navy and built the F-4E it had a 20 mm gun built into the airplane. The F-4E was the best fighter in the world in its day and if we had that airplane with the gun in it we would have had much more success against the MIG-17s and 21s in Southeast Asia. We have not built a fighter since that did not have a gun built in. . . . It was a hard lesson we learned or I should say re-learned. It's a shame we have to keep're-inventing the wheel." If our present day Air Force leaders do not read and pay attention to history then we will make the same stupid mistakes again and again and again." Acknowledgements: Material for this monograph was gathered from many sources, among them: "Aces & Aerial Victories, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-1973," Office of the U.S. Air Force Historian; ?Check Six? by Frederick C. Blesse, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; letters and telephone interviews with Jones E. Bolt, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; Robert Tanguy, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; Robert D. Janca, Colonel, USAF, Ret.; and James A. Hargrove, Lt. Col., USAF, Ret.
Criteria The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, kill... The Purple Heart may be awarded to any member of the Armed Forces of the United States who, while serving under competent authority in any capacity with one of the Armed Forces, has been wounded, killed, or who has died or may die of wounds received in armed combat or as a result of an act of international terrorism. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospital... The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and medical centers (whether or not they are numbered) for exceptionally meritorious service or exceptionally outstanding achievement that clearly sets the unit above and apart from similar units. Heroism may be involved, but is not essential. MoreHide
Criteria The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospital... The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and medical centers (whether or not they are numbered) for exceptionally meritorious service or exceptionally outstanding achievement that clearly sets the unit above and apart from similar units. Heroism may be involved, but is not essential. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brig... Awarded by the Vietnam Government to military personnel who have accomplished deeds of valor or displayed heroic conduct while fighting the enemy and have been cited individually at the regiment, brigade, division, corps, or armed forces level. MoreHide
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Criteria The United States Air Force awards a single ribbon, known as the Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon, for an expert qualification on either the M-16 rifle, M-4 carbine or the individuals AFSC's (dut... The United States Air Force awards a single ribbon, known as the Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon, for an expert qualification on either the M-16 rifle, M-4 carbine or the individuals AFSC's (duty) designated handgun weapon. The ribbon is issued in only one degree; however, a bronze service star may be worn on the ribbon for those who have qualified expert on both the service rifle and handgun. MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United... The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United Nations. Service in qualifying organizations had to be certified by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief as having directly supported military operations in Korea. In the case of the United States, such certification was issued in General Orders 31 (June 20, 1955); General Orders 33 (July 11, 1955); and General Orders 36 (July 13, 1955). MoreHide
Criteria Criteria for award of the Republic of Korea Korean War Service Medal (ROK KWSM) have been established by the ROK government. To qualify for the medal, the veteran must have: Served between the outbrea... Criteria for award of the Republic of Korea Korean War Service Medal (ROK KWSM) have been established by the ROK government. To qualify for the medal, the veteran must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities, June 25, 1950, and the date the armistice was signed, July 27, 1953, Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days Performed his / her duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operations or in support of combat operations MoreHide
Criteria The Distinguished Flying Cross may be awarded to military members who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism or outstanding achievement while participa... The Distinguished Flying Cross may be awarded to military members who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism or outstanding achievement while participating in aerial flight. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Source: http://www.366fightergroupassoc.org/GunfighterName.htm 366th Fighter Group Association Best Little Stories How the Gunfighters Got Their Name by Stanley E. Anderson, MSgt, USAF, Ret. Background. Early 1967 found the situation at the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, Danang AB, Vietnam "fluid," our mission was constantly changing as were our tactics, frustration was high and morale could have been a lot better. Our three Tactical Fighter Squadrons, the 389th, 390th and 480th, were equipped with the F-4C Phantom, at the time the premier fighter in the Air Force inventory. Our aircrews were flying a variety of missions; close air support for the US Army and Marines in South Vietnam, interdicting supply and communication lines over North Vietnam and Laos, top cover for F-105 Thunderchiefs (Thuds) bombing in North Vietnam and other special missions fragged by 7th Air Force. Our World War II forebears of the 366th Fighter Group would have been proud of us, we were some of the best "mud shovelers" in the world, strafing, bombing, laying down CBU's (cluster bomb units), etc. Strafing was performed using the SUU-16 gun pod, an electrically driven, six barrel Gatling minigun containing 1000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition with a firing rate of 100 rounds per second. For whatever reason, our aircraft losses were unacceptably high and in mid-February "Charlie" (the Viet Cong) had visited us on the ground with Russian 144mm rockets, some of which landed in one of the barracks areas on the base. When flying up North, our aircrews were hamstrung by insane Rules of Engagement; we were prohibited from flying within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi, 4 miles from the center of Haiphong and 30 miles from the China border. Furthermore we could only strike very restricted targets within 30 miles of Hanoi and 10 miles of Haiphong. Until the middle of April we couldn't even strike North Vietnamese airfields, so their jets could attack with impunity and dash back to their "safe havens." On those rare instances when our pilots did tangle with enemy aircraft, MiG-17s, MiG-19s and MiG-21s -- the smaller, lighter, more agile aircraft could turn tighter than the heavier F-4s. The Phantom's close-in air-to-air capability was further hampered by the limitations of its weapons. When the F-4 was designed in the early 1950's, the assumption was that missiles would be the weapons of the future so there was no need to include a gun on the aircraft. Enemy pilots quickly figured out that the radar beam-riding AIM-7 "Sparrow" and infrared heat-seeking AIM-9 "Sidewinder" missiles didn't arm themselves until 1500 feet after being fired so one of their favorite tactics when being chased was to allow the Phantoms to close within 1500 feet. It was not uncommon to hear pilots returning from a flight exclaim, "If I only had a brick I could have knocked him out of the air!" or something similar. On January 2, 1967, the 366th TFW participated in Operation Bolo, a MiG sweep over North Vietnam. The winter monsoon weather was bad. Our rivals, the F-4s of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing "Wolfpack" at Ubon AB, Thailand, knocked down seven MiG?s and, as luck would have it, we got none. And, of course, they got all the publicity and made the most of it. After the 8th TFW got two more MiGs on January 6th the North Vietnamese Air Force decided to stand down for training and no more MIGs were seen until early March. In March and into April, there were a few encounters, with seven MiGs being downed by F-105 Thunderchiefs from the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, Tahkli, Thailand. But it was clear from their tactics that enemy pilots didn't want to come up and play with the Phantoms. The Gun Comes of Age. Things were clearly due for a change and when they did, they changed fast. On March 20th, 1967, the 366th TFW received a new commander, Colonel (Brig. Gen. selectee) Jones E. Bolt and within a few days, a new Deputy Commander for Operations, Colonel Frederick C. "Boots" Blesse. General Bolt describes what happened next. "After a few days at Danang I scheduled myself as the element lead in a flight of four to fly top cover for the "Thuds" into Route Pack 6 (Hanoi). After a detailed briefing we went to our aircraft and I could not believe the configuration of the F-4. There was a 600 gallon centerline tank, the ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) pod on the left outboard station where we normally had a 400 gallon fuel tank; a 400 gallon tank on the right outboard station as it was supposed to be; the two Sidewinder missiles on each of the two inboard stations and of course the Sparrow missiles on the fuselage as was normal. These were the radar guided missiles we always carried on top cover or air-to-air missions. The airplane was asymmetrically loaded and it was not only unstable but would fly sideways! The only saving grace to this lousy configuration was that as soon as we hit the Black River going into North Vietnam we would jettison the centerline tank and that would make the airplane fly a little better. But if you got into a fight with the MiGs you would jettison everything except the ECM pod. We used to joke among ourselves occasionally that every time we dropped the 600 gallon centerline tank we had just dropped a Cadillac on the North Vietnamese. But the seriousness of dropping the centerline tank was that if you did not drop it in straight and level flight under 450 knots it was likely to damage the aft fuselage and the elevators on the airplane -- not a good situation over enemy territory. "After landing and debriefing I called my Ops and Maintenance people together and asked them how they came up with this configuration. Everybody said that the reason was that the ECM pod which was much smaller than the 400 gallon fuel tank and resulted in much less drag, could only be carried on the outboard station and you had to drop off the outboard fuel tank to do that. This was a case of the Maintenance people dictating to the Ops people how the airplane would be configured and it was a terrible mistake. Not only was the airplane unstable to fly that way it was terribly expensive to drop all those tanks on almost every mission. And keep in mind that we were flying 16 top cover sorties every day at the least. "I gave the problem some thought that night and talked to my squadron commanders and I just knew that there was a better way. The next morning I went down to our armament shop and got in touch with the Chief Master Sergeant who ran the place and had been running my armament shop at the F-4 Combat Crew Training Wing at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ that I commanded before going to Vietnam. I said to him, "Chief, can you make a wiring harness that can be installed on the inboard pylon that will operate the ECM pod?" He said to me, " we'll give it a try, but you know, Colonel, we cannot legally rewire the airplane without getting permission from Logistics Command because the inboard pylons are wired to carry nuclear weapons." I told my good Chief... that if he did not say anything about it I would not. I told him the reason was that we needed to do something about the configuration of the airplane to make it symmetrical and further that we could not hit a MIG-17s and few MiG-21s with the Sidewinders and only occasionally with the Sparrows and I wanted to put the (SUU-16) gun pod on the centerline station. But to do this we had to drop off two Sidewinders and install the ECM pod on the inboard pylon. This would give us a pretty stable and symmetrical airplane and we would not have to drop off those tanks on almost every mission. "The next afternoon the Chief called me to come down to his shop and we got into my staff car and went out to the F-4 he had rewired. It was a very simple wiring harness with a cannon plug on each end that could be removed in a couple of minutes and the ECM pod worked great. I flew the airplane and checked it out with our radar site at Monkey Mountain and it worked like a charm. I told him to make enough of them so we could configure enough airplanes to fly 16 sorties a day into Route Pack Six to cover the Thuds. I talked to all the Ops people and they were ecstatic that we were putting the 20 mm gun pod on the centerline and they could hit the MiG-17s and MIG-21s even though we had a lousy gun sight in the F-4C." The first hurdle overcome, Colonel Bolt called Lt. Gen. Momyer, the 7th Air Force Commander in Saigon, to inform him, "because, after all, he was my boss and would be writing my performance report and possibly my obituary." Receiving approval to move forward, Colonel Bolt turned the project over to Colonel Blesse and the Ops people to "wring out" the new configuration. Colonel Blesse put together a weapons section comprised of Lt. Col. Fred Haeffner, Majors Sam Bakke, Bob Dilger, Ed Lipsey and Jerry Robinette and Captains "Skip" Cox, Jim Craig and Bob Novak. Throughout the month of April they worked through every conceivable situation including gun problems, munitions loads, barrier procedures, chaff drops, drag chute procedures, ECM devices, bombing and air-to-air procedures. One of the major problems to be surmounted was that the F-4 did not contain a computing gun sight. Another peculiarity was that the SUU-16 gun pod was self-powered by a small turbine (known as a "rat") which was deployed in flight and worked reasonably well above 500 knots -- but only if deployed at speeds below 450 knots. If deployed at a faster speed its performance was questionable. With all the problems worked through, in early May Colonel Blesse flew down to Saigon to brief General Momyer and receive final approval. General Momyer's approval was luke warm at best and may have been influenced by a comment made by Colonel Robin Olds, the 8th Tac Fighter Wing commander, who happened to be present at the briefing and who dismissed the presentation with, "General, I wouldn't touch that thing with a ten-foot pole." But "GO" was the word and with modification of more aircraft the hunt was on. About this time, a change was made in air tactics of our strike forces. Throughout March and April, MIGCAP F-4s would sweep through the target area five minutes prior to the arrival of the flights of F-105 strike aircraft which were themselves spaced three to five minutes apart. In May this was changed so that the first flight of F-105s would be closely followed by a flight of four MIGCAP F-4s which in turn would be followed by more F-105s and finally a flight of Phantoms bringing up the rear. The first 366th F-4s carrying guns for air-to-air combat were flown into Route Pack Six starting on May 12th but for the first two days the strike aircraft went unchallenged. On May 14th, sixteen MIG's rose to take on the first wave of F-105s. Seven of the MIGs tangled with four Phantoms and two MiGs fell as the first victims of the guns wielded by Major Jim Hargrove and Capt Jim Craig. The second F-4 flight also downed a MiG with a Sparrow fired by Major Sam Bakke (see separate story, "May 14, 1967 - The Day of the Gun "). During the period April 23 - June 5, 1967 eleven MiGs were downed by aircrews of the 366th Tactical Fight Wing -- four to the 20 mm guns. No USAF Tactical Fighter Wing downed as many aircraft in such a short period in the entire eight years of the air war in the skies over Southeast Asia. As Lt. Colonel (later Major General) Bob Tanguy, 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron commander, said, "I don't think the MiGs ever figured out that the F-4s were carrying guns." And he may well be right because a review of after action reports shows that no parachutes were reported from the MiGs downed by F-4C guns. In any case after June 5th the North Vietnamese Air Force, having lost 54 aircraft in April, May and June, went into another stand down for the remainder of June and July to reevaluate their situation. At about the same time, the 366th Wing?s mission was again changed back to air-to-ground work, but not before Colonel Blesse and a group of pilots had gotten together and come up with a name and emblem by which the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing has been known ever since, "The Gunfighters." Epilogue. By October 1967, all F-4Cs in Southeast Asia, and later the F-4Ds, were reconfigured to carry the SUU-16 and SUU-23 minigun pods for air-to-air combat, including those of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing in Thailand. Perhaps General Bolt provides the best summary, "(The gun pod) was so successful that when the Air Force got control of the F-4 program from the Navy and built the F-4E it had a 20 mm gun built into the airplane. The F-4E was the best fighter in the world in its day and if we had that airplane with the gun in it we would have had much more success against the MIG-17s and 21s in Southeast Asia. We have not built a fighter since that did not have a gun built in. . . . It was a hard lesson we learned or I should say re-learned. It's a shame we have to keep're-inventing the wheel." If our present day Air Force leaders do not read and pay attention to history then we will make the same stupid mistakes again and again and again." Acknowledgements: Material for this monograph was gathered from many sources, among them: "Aces & Aerial Victories, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-1973," Office of the U.S. Air Force Historian; ?Check Six? by Frederick C. Blesse, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; letters and telephone interviews with Jones E. Bolt, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; Robert Tanguy, Maj. Gen., USAF, Ret.; Robert D. Janca, Colonel, USAF, Ret.; and James A. Hargrove, Lt. Col., USAF, Ret.