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This Remembrance Profile was originally created by CMSgt Don Skinner - Deceased
Description For the first three weeks, UN ground forces advanced everywhere along the front except in a small area near the Hwachon Reservoir in the central sector. Then the communists launched an all-out spring offensive with over 330,000 troops using "human wave" tactics. By the end of the month the enemy had advanced to the vicinity of Seoul, but both men and supplies had reached their limits in the face of UN ground and aerial assaults.
In counter air operations, Fifth Air Force Sabre pilots destroyed fifteen MiGs without the loss of a friendly fighter. MiG pilots generally showed little aggressiveness but on several occasions demonstrated considerable flight discipline and improved tactics. In North Korea, the enemy constructed new airfields and rehabilitated previously damaged ones, pointing toward the possibility of a major enemy air-ground offensive.
General Stratemeyer, Commander, Far East Air Forces, consequently directed most B-29s against North Korean airfields. B-26 light bombers attacked rails, bridges, airfields, and supply storage areas during daylight. Following the start of the spring offensive, Fifth Air Force increased the number of B-26 close air support sorties from
approximately five to twenty-five per day. B-26 night operations emphasized armed reconnaissance and interdiction of communications routes and facilities.
Before the Communist offensive began, Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers flew an average of 250 armed reconnaissance and interdiction, and eighty close air support sorties per day. Following the start of the attack, however, Fifth Air Force increased its close air support sorties to an average of 140 daily.
315th AD airdrop operations through most of April suffered from the grounding of seventy-five C-119s, which left C-46s as the primary airdrop-capable aircraft. By the end of the month, sixty C-119s were once again in commission. A clandestine C-47 outfit under the control of 315th AD and known as "Unit 4/Special Air Mission (SAM)" flew leaflet and personnel/resupply drops and made aerial broadcasts and radio intercepts over enemy-held territory. The 6160th ABG's Boat Section saved one individual, assisted with three other saves, recovered one body, and retrieved the wreckage of an aircraft.
During the first half of the month of May, UN ground activity consisted mainly of patrols and preparation for another enemy offensive. By the end of the month UN ground forces had regained the initiative, advancing the front lines northward between fifteen and thirty miles across the peninsula. Far East Air Forces conducted heavy, continuous interdiction of enemy supply lines, which contributed largely to the complete failure of the communist offensive. But, the enemy increased anti-aircraft heavy guns and automatic weapons to approximately one thousand, at eighteen different locations in North Korea.
In a slow month, Fifth Air Force Sabre pilots downed five MiGs. FEAF Bomber Command B-29s initially bombed rail and highway bridges, airfields, and supply and troop centers in North Korea. When the communists initiated their offensive, however, Bomber Command shifted nearly its entire effort to close air support.
Until mid-May, Fifth Air Force flew a daily average of 171 armed reconnaissance and interdiction, and fifty-seven close air support sorties; later in the month, its aircraft averaged more than 140 close air support sorties daily. Prior to the enemy offensive, the light bomber, assisted by flare-dropping C-47s, flew night intruder sorties against enemy vehicles. With the enemy assault, Fifth Air Force shifted its B-26 effort to daytime close air support. Led by the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, between May 19 and 25, Far East Air Forces flew 388 reconnaissance sorties, a new record.
At the end of the month, Fifth Air Force and the USN Task Force 77 initiated an interdiction campaign called Operation STRANGLE to paralyze enemy transportation between the railheads and the front. Fighter-bombers hit bridges, tunnels, rail lines, and roadbeds, trying to stop rail and highway traffic carrying supplies for enemy troops along the front.
In psychological operations, B-29 and C-47 aircraft dropped millions of leaflets. Most consisted of "strategic" leaflets dropped deep behind enemy lines, while the remainder were "tactical," directed at troops near the front. The 3d ARS established an element on the island of Paengnyang-do, located off the west coast of Korea, where H-5 helicopters stood alert for rescue sorties.
The squadron began rotating the SA-16 amphibious aircraft between Japan and Korea, with three flying from Korean bases for ten to fifteen days before being replaced with new crews and aircraft from Japan. The crash rescue Boat Section of the 6160st ABG saved three lives and evacuated two hundred guerrillas from behind enemy lines to safety.
Although ammunition and petroleum products made up the bulk of airlifted items, the 315th AD began daily delivery of approximately fifteen tons of fresh vegetables from Japan to Eighth U.S. Army supply points in Korea.
In June 1951, despite enemy resistance and spring mud, UN forces regained their losses from the communist spring offensive and broke into the Pyonggang-Chorwon-Kumhwa "Iron Triangle" fortified sanctuaries, enabling them to deny the enemy access to roads that traversed the Korean Peninsula just above the 38th parallel.
FEAF bombardment operations concentrated on radar bombing attacks against the Iron Triangle sanctuaries. FEAF Bomber Command began experimenting with B-29s using the shoran bombing technique. This technique used radio navigation beacons and extremely accurate maps to aim bombs, thereby avoiding the limitations of
visual and radar bombardment.
The problem of defending B-29s against MiG-15s and the development of shoran tactics would ultimately lead to the bombers operating almost exclusively at night. Far East Air Forces concentrated interdiction attacks on enemy airfields in North Korea, since the enemy were trying to reconstruct them to accommodate more aircraft. In mid-June General Weyland directed FEAF Bomber Command to keep the thirteen most important fields out of service.
Fifth Air Force combat units completed their movement from Japan to air bases in Korea. But much of the maintenance support remained in Japan, creating some problems with aircraft readiness. On the other hand, concentration of maintenance in Japan permitted the sharing of scarce skilled personnel and other resources.
The psychological warfare unit made sixty-six leaflet drops and twenty-five voice broadcasts, dropped eighteen people behind enemy lines and flying one resupply drop. The Boat Section, 6160th ABG, completed sixty-three missions, saving two lives, and used one boat in the Yellow Sea to insert South Korean guerrillas behind enemy lines and transport Chinese POWs to South Korea.
July 1951 marked the beginning of a new phase in the Korean War. Strategic military considerations of UN and communist commanders centered on armistice negotiations that began this month. Both sides began to bend their military efforts
to effect favorable outcomes in these negotiations.
Accordingly, Far East Air Forces increased the tempo of fighter and light-bomber activities in Operation STRANGLE, particularly against vehicular movements and targets of known troops, supplies, or installations. As the shortcomings of Operation STRANGLE became evident, FEAF planners looked for other ways to stem the flow of enemy resources toward the front.
The enormous buildup in the numbers of MiG-15 air supremacy fighters and growing experience and competence of pilots led the enemy to seek air superiority as far south as Pyongyang. Avoiding formidable jet fighter formations escorting FEAF Bomber Command B-29s, the MiGs attacked vulnerable fighter-bomber and
reconnaissance aircraft operating north of Pyongyang. Greatly outnumbered, the USAF F-86s now had to defend UN aircraft engaged in reconnaissance and interdiction operations as well as the bombers operating in the north while fighting the MiG-15s head-to-head for air supremacy.
An absence of major ground activity and decline in airlift requirements coincided with frequent periods of unfavorable weather. Far East Air Forces also faced growing shortages of aircraft because of attrition and increased numbers of aircraft out of commission. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, notified General Weyland that Far East Air Forces could not expect further augmentation in jet fighters, since a general build-up in Europe required more aircraft. Also, other aircraft types, particularly B-26s and F-51s, which were experiencing high attrition rates, could not be replaced because they were no longer in production.
