Knebel, Thomas Edward, CMSgt

Fallen
 
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Last Rank
Chief Master Sergeant
Primary Unit
1967-1968, 41st Tactical Airlift Squadron
Service Years
1967 - 1968
Chief Master Sergeant

 Last Photo   Personal Details 


Home State
Arkansas
Arkansas
Year of Birth
1947
 
This Military Service Page was created/owned by SSgt John Paul Jones, Sr. (JJ) to remember Knebel, Thomas Edward (Blind Bat 01), CMSgt.

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Casualty Info
Home Town
Midway
Last Address
Naha AB, Okinawa
Ubon RTAFB, Thailand

Casualty Date
May 22, 1968
 
Cause
Hostile, Died while Missing
Reason
Air Loss, Crash - Land
Location
Laos
Conflict
Vietnam War
Location of Interment
Arlington National Cemetery - Arlington, Virginia
Wall/Plot Coordinates
65E 012

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American Battle Monuments CommissionVietnam Veterans Memorial
  2009, American Battle Monuments Commission
  2012, Vietnam Veterans Memorial [Verified] - Assoc. Page

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Aircrew Enlisted (Basic)


 
 Unit Assignments
374th Tactical Airlift Wing41st Tactical Airlift Squadron
  1967-1968, 374th Tactical Airlift Wing
  1967-1968, 41st Tactical Airlift Squadron
 Combat and Non-Combat Operations
  1965-1973 Vietnam War
 My Aircraft/Missiles
AC-130A Gunship  
  1967-1968, AC-130A Gunship
 Additional Information
Last Known Activity

On 22 May 1968, Lt. Col. William H. Mason, pilot; Capt. Thomas B. Mitchell, co-pilot; Capt. William T. McPhail, navigator; then Major Jerry L. Chambers, observer; SSgt. Calvin C. Glover, flight engineer; AM1 Thomas E. Knebel, crewchief; Sgt. Gary Pate, loadmaster; AM1 Melvin D. Rash, loadmaster; and AM1 John Q. Adam, loadmaster; comprised the crew of an A130C aircraft, call sign "Blind Bat 01." They were on a normally scheduled night flair drop mission on a frag operation that was to orbit the target area. The region of eastern Laos adjacent to the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam was known as Foxtrot and contained major arteries of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. The target was in the vicinity of the communist airfield located at Tchepone, Savannakhet Province, Laos.

When North Vietnam began to increase its military strength in South Vietnam, NVA and Viet Cong troops again intruded on neutral Laos for sanctuary, as the Viet Minh had done during the war with the French some years before. This border road was used by the Communists to transport weapons, supplies and troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and was frequently no more than a path cut through the jungle covered mountains. US forces used all assets available to them to stop this flow of men and supplies from moving south into the war zone.

Weather conditions in the area were scattered clouds with visibility of 6 miles. The terrain was mountainous with heavy foliage and an occasional clearing.

At 2055 hours Blind Bat 01 made its last radio contact with the airborne mission command and control center as it was orbiting the target area. At that time the aircraft was positioned near the city of Muong Nong and there was no indication of trouble.

By 2125 hours, the airborne command and control center was unable to raise Blind Bat 01 on the radio, another C130A, call sign Blind Bat 02, was called in to investigate non-contact with Blind Bat 01 and it arrived onsite 15 minutes later. Blind Bat 02 found a large fire on the ground, but when they attempted to investigate the fire, they were driven off by enemy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire. Another aircraft was called in to participate in the aerial search that was equipped with night photography equipment. The photographs it took could not confirm whether or not the fire was associated with an aircraft crash site, but the photo interpreters were of the opinion that the circular fire resembled that of a crashed aircraft. The photography showed no evidence of any parachutes on the ground, and none of the aircrews heard mayday calls or emergency beeper signals emanating from the jungle below.

Because of a lack of any positive evidence of survivors, aircraft wreckage or beepers, no formal search and rescue (SAR) effort was initiated. However, aerial photographs were taken the following day. Again, there was no indication of aircraft wreckage, and the fire burning on the ground the night before had been extinguished. Likewise, there were no signs of survivors in or around the area. At the time the aerial search effort was terminated, Jerry Chambers, William Mason, Thomas Knebel, John Adam, William McPhail, Gary Pate, Melvin Rash and Calvin Glover were listed Missing In Action.

The location of loss was deep within enemy held territory approximately 8 miles southwest of Tavouac, 29 miles west of the Lao/South Vietnamese border, 33 miles west of the A Shau Valley, South Vietnam; and 43 miles south-southeast of the town of Tchepone, Saravane Province, Laos. It was located on the west edge of mountain foothills within 1 mile of a primary north/south road running along the east side of a long, narrow jungle covered valley. Along the west side of the valley ran a power line that paralleled the road. The distance between the road and the power line was often only 1 mile or less and never more than 3 miles as they both continued through the mountains to the south of the valley.

From 1981 to 1984, the Special Forces Detachment, Korea was charged by President Reagan with the responsibility of collecting live POW information throughout Southeast Asia. "SFDK" was commanded by Major Mark Smith, himself a returned POW from the Vietnam War. Through his efforts, and those of team Intelligence Sergeant Mel McIntire, an agent net of 50 agents was established, specifically in Laos. This intelligence net resulted in Major Smith compiling a list of some 26 American POWs by name and captivity location including one man with the last name of "Glover" being one of them. There are two men who are POW/MIAs with that last name and both were lost in Laos.

In April 1984, Major Smith received a message from one of his agents specifying that on 11 May three US Prisoners of War would be brought to a given location on the Lao/Thai border. The only prerequisite was that an American be on the Thailand side of the border to receive the men.

When this information was reported up his chain of command, Major Smith's team was ordered not to leave Korea, to destroy all documents pertaining to LIVE POWs and they were sent back to the United States 6 months early. This documented information was provided to the United States Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in sworn testimony on 28 January 1986.

In June 1989, a source turned in the drawing of an identity card and restricted area access card with the name of Gary Pate on them. In August 1989, a Vietnamese source provided dog tag information from a member of an ethnic minority residing in South Laos together with a photograph reportedly showing human remains at an unknown location. In May 1991, a source in Thailand reported dogtag information associated with Pate. The source stated he had received the information from a "central Vietnamese" who located the dogtag while looking for incense wood near Hue City, South Vietnam, and had instructed the source to provide the information to the US government upon his arrival in Bangkok. In October 1991, US investigators from the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting who were working in Vietnam at the time were again provided dogtag information pertaining to Sgt. Pate along with a bone fragment. The US personnel were told by the source that he was an intermediary acting for others.


   
Comments/Citation
Vietnam Wall Panel coords 65E 012
   
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