Criteria The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or,... The American Campaign Medal was awarded for For thirty days service outside the Continental United States but within the American Theater of Operations between December 7, 1941, and March 2, 1946; or, an aggregate service of one year within the Continental United States during the same period under the following circumstances: On permanent assignment outside the continental limits of the United States; or, On permanent assignment as a member of a crew of a vessel sailing ocean waters for a period of 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days; or, For service outside the continental limits of the United States in a passenger status or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non consecutive days; or, For service in active combat against the enemy and awarded a combat decoration or furnished a certificate by the commanding general of a corps, higher unit, or independent force that the individual actually participated in combat; or, For service within the continental limits of the United States for an aggregate period of one year. MoreHide
Criteria The Army of Occupation Medal is a military award of the United States military which was established by the United States War Department on 5 April 1946. The medal was created in the aftermath of the ... The Army of Occupation Medal is a military award of the United States military which was established by the United States War Department on 5 April 1946. The medal was created in the aftermath of the Second World War to recognize those who had performed occupation service in either Germany, Italy, Austria, or Japan. MoreHide
Criteria The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspa... The Vietnam Service Medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served at any time between July 4, 1965, and March 28, 1973, in Vietnam or its contiguous waters or airspace; or, for any period of service during the same time period in Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia or the air spaces thereover and in direct support of operations in Vietnam. MoreHide
Criteria
The Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation is a military unit award issued by the government of South Korea to both South Korean and foreign military units.
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical l... This medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who: 1. Served for 6 months in South Vietnam during the period 1 Mar 61 and 28 Mar 73; or 2. Served outside the geographical limits of South Vietnam and contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces for an aggregate of six months. Only members of the Armed Forces of the United States who meet the criteria established for the AFEM (Vietnam) or Vietnam Service Medal during the period of service required are considered to have contributed direct combat support to the RVN Armed Forces; or 3. Did not complete the length of service required in item (1) or (2) above, but who, during wartime, were: a. Wounded by the enemy (in a military action); b. Captured by the enemy during action or in the line of duty, but later rescued or released; or c. Killed in action or in the line of duty; or 4. Were assigned in Vietnam on 28 Jan 73, and who served a minimum of 60 calendar days in Vietnam during the period 29 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73. MoreHide
Best Friends
ONCE IN A LIFETIME: Once in lifetime a light shines so bright, so pure?That darkness is defeated in its presence. Once in a lifetime will an individual, beyond all odds, rise to meet the challenge. Once in a lifetime we will be given the opportunity to honor them. Let it not pass us by? Let us shine brightly? Once in a lifetime. Let us help all to remember? That within the human spirit lives the ability to rise up and overcome all odds? if but once in a lifetime.
Best Moment
Going Home
Worst Moment
Was grounded with inter ear infection in both ears, Became Night Ground Safety Officer. Worked 16 hour days and it was to hot to sleep lost 60 Lbs age 10 years.
Chain of Command
Col.Jame Pyle was over 71st SOS.
Other Memories
TIME PERIOD
HISTORICAL FACTS
April 11 1968
930th Tactical Airlift Group (TAG) of the Continental Air Command (CONAC) and 71st Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS) received 30-day notice of call-up to active duty.
May 13 1968
930th TAG/71st TAS reported for active duty at Bakalar AFB, Indiana. Eighteen (18) C-119G Aircraft, 83 Officers, 254 Airmen affected.
June 11 1968
71st TAS moved to Lockbourne AFB; Columbus, Ohio.
June 15 1968
71st TAS designated 71st Air Commando Squadron (ACS).
July 8 1968
71st ACS designated 71st Special Operations Squadron (SOS). Entire USAF Air Commando Command designated Special Operations.
Summer 1968
Transition from C-119G cargo configuration to AC-119G Gunships. 1968 Flight crew augmentation, combat training, ground maintenance training at Lockbourne AFB.
Nov 28 1968
Deputy Defense Secretary Nitze approves deployment of the 71st SOS to South Vietnam.
Dec 5 1968
First two (2) AC-119G Gunships depart Lockbourne for Nha Trang.
Dec 20 1968
71st SOS assigned to 14th Special Operations Wing at Nha Trang.
Jan 5 1969
First combat mission flown out of Nha Trang, RVN.
Jan 29 1969
Last AC-119G gunship departs Lockbourne for South Vietnam.
Feb 1969
Forward Operation Locations (FOLs) established at Phan Rang AB and Tan Son Nhut AB (Saigon).
March 1 1969
All eighteen (18) AC-119G gunships safely in South Vietnam.
March 11 1969
71st SOS declared C-1 ?Combat Ready?. June 1 1969
Activation of the 17th Special Operations Squadron, replacing the 71st SOS. The 17th SOS absorbed approximately 65% of the 71st SOS personnel.
June 5 1969
71st SOS Reservists depart Nha Trang AB for Indiana, USA.
June 6 1969
71st SOS Reservists arrive at Bakalar AFB; Columbus, Indiana.
Description This period was from November 1, 1968-February 22, 1969.
Following the cessation of bombing on October 3,. 1968, the United States for the next 4 years restricted flights over North Vietnam primarily This period was from November 1, 1968-February 22, 1969.
Following the cessation of bombing on October 3,. 1968, the United States for the next 4 years restricted flights over North Vietnam primarily to reconnaissance missions. The Air Force diverted airpower resources committed to the campaign over North Vietnam to the air campaign in Laos in an attempt to slow the flow of suppliesfrom North Vietnam down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This interdiction effort covered an area in the Laotian panhandle from about the 16th to the 18th parallel and focused on the Laotian/North Vietnamese border near the Keo Nua, Mu Ola, and Ban Karai Passes. Much information about targets on the l-lo Chi Minh Trail came from air-dropped electronic sensors. When American bombing choked the major transportation arteries. the North Vietnamese directed truck convoys along secondary roads where they became more vulnerable to tactical air strikes. Throughout November and December 1968 U.S. tactical aircraft and B-52s attacked targets in the Laotian panhandle. AC-130 gunships, flying at night and relying on infrared, radar, and other sensors. proved especially effective in destroying trucks. To counter the intense air attacks, the North Vietnamese quadrupled the number of anti-aircraft guns along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, while adding logistical personnel in Laos for repair work and transport duties.
The USAF also provided close air support to hard-pressed Royal and irregular Laotian forces in northem Laos, where on December 25, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops launched a strong offensive. By late February 1969 the enemy had driven the Laotian forces back across the Plain of Jars to Na Khang.
In South Vietnam, meanwhile. the Viet Cong suffered temporary setbacks under Allied air and ground attacks. On November 1, 1968, the Republic of Vietnam began a military and civic pacification program intended to bring most of the onuttry quickly under government control. Two operations underscored Allied military approaches to pacification.
In the first, the Allies learrted of a large enemy force moving into the Savy Rieng Province, Cambodia. the so-called “Parrot's Beak" that jutted deep into South Vietnam northwest of Saigon. To thwart this penetration, between October 18 and November 11, 1968, the U.S. Air Force airlifted 11,500 men of the U.S. lst Cavalry Division and 3,400 tons of cargo in C-130s over 500 miles from Quang Tri Province in the north to Tay Ninh. Binh Long. and Phuoc Long Provinces. northwest of Saigon. Until the tum of the year, these U.S. Army forces. working with the South Vietnamese, conducted operations in the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border area along the Parrot‘s Beak between the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. The USAF supported these operations with tactical aircraft and B-52s flying air support and interdiction missions against troop concentrations, base areas, logistics complexes and transportation lines. In the second major winter operation. starting the first week of December. the Seventh Air Force launched another air campaign in the A Shau Valley, located near the Cambodian border some 30 miles southwest of Hue. Afterward, in January 1969. U.S. Marines entered the valley and found large amounts of materiel that the Communists had abandoned unable to move it during the sustained air attacks. After months of negotiations on January 18, 1969, representatives of the government of South Vietnam and of the National Liberation Front. the Communist political branch in South Vietnam joined the United States and North Vietnam in the Paris peace talks. While negotiations continued in France, the Communist forces in Vietnam launched their first offensive of the new year. ... More
Criteria The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of Sout... The Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Colors) was authorized to be worn by units individually cited for service in military operations in support of the government of South Vietnam. The actions cited are for the same services that would have resulted in the award of a Valorous Unit Citation by the Army or a Navy Unit Citation. MoreHide
Worst Moment
Some history of what Herb did when he was in the Dominican Republic. History does repeat it's self.
Operation Powerpack When civil strife broke out in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, the United States decided to dispatch troops to protect American lives and to prevent a possible Castro-type takeover by Communist elements. Marines were landed on 28 April from ships offshore and two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division and their supporting forces were ordered to move with minimum essential equipment from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, on the 29th of April.
Fighting broke out in the Dominican Republic on Saturday, 24 April. By Tuesday, 27 April, the situation had deteriorated and the U.S. took the precaution of stationing a task force - including USS Boxer (LPH-4) and 1,500 Marines - off the Dominican Coast. Removal of U.S. citizens, however, was not ordered until two days later, when Dominican government officials warned that they could no longer guarantee the safety of foreign nationals.
On the evening of the 28th Boxer airlifted 400 Marines into the city of Santo Domingo for the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens. By the following morning, 29 April, 530 Marines were in the city. Later in the day they were joined by 1,000 reinforcements. While Marines cleared a safety zone between the U.S. Embassy and the Embajador Hotel, where refugees were gathered, helos ferried civilians to Boxer for further transfer to other Navy ships in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
POWER PACK I, as the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, was designated for the move, contained 2,253 men. Approximately 67 hours after it was alerted, lead elements of POWER PACK I became airborne. Employing 111 heavy drop aircraft and 33 personnel carrying aircraft, the 3d Brigade headed for Puerto Rico. While enroute, however, Washington political and military leaders changed the destination of the force to San Isidro Airfield, Dominican Republic and ordered the 3d Brigade to airland instead of airdrop. This change caused some immediate problems since ground materiel handling equipment was not available at San Isidro to unload heavy drop loads and the equipment had to be unloaded manually. In addition San Isidro soon became saturated and only the 33 personnel carrying and 46 of the heavy drop aircraft were able to land on the 29th. This development separated the troops from much of their equipment at a critical moment. Fortunately no opposition to the landings arose and the missing equipment which had been landed at Puerto Rico was flow in to San Isidro the following day.
POWER PACK II, the 2d Brigade (-) of the 82d Airborne Division, was alerted on 28 April and ordered to move to the Dominican Republic on 1 May. The force contained two airborne battalions and supporting elements with a total of 2,276 men. Using the same planes as the 3d Brigade on a shuttle basis as they became available, the POWER PACK II force also arrived in the Dominican Republic approximately 72 hours after it was alerted.
By 1 May paratroop units had been flown into the city, bring the U.S. military strength to about 4,200 men. As the safety zone was sealed off and the waterfront area was secured, Navy ships began to take refugees directly aboard. On 2 May the Navy transported 1,415 civilians to San Juan, raising the total number to 3,000. In Santo Domingo 5,000 more awaited rescue - about 1,500 of them citizens of 30 different countries. On 3 May Great Britain officially thanked the U.S. for having evacuated British citizens from the danger area.
Navy ships which played a major part in the rescue mission included: USS Boxer (LPH-4), Wood County (LST-1178) Ruchamkin (APD-89) and Yancey (AKA-93). Other ships involved were: USS Rankin (AKA-103), Fort Snelling (LSD-30) and Raleigh (LPD-1).
The third echelon of the 82d Airborne Division, POWER PACK III, contained the remainder of the 2d Brigade, consisting of two airborne battalions and support forces, and elements of the 5th Logistical Command to provide logistical backup; it totalled 3,302 men and officers. POWER PACK III was shuttled in between the afternoon of 2 May and the morning of 3 May. With the bulk of six airborne battalions concentrated in the vicinity of San Isidro Airfield located east of the capital city of Santo Domingo, the Army units moved west to link up with the Marine forces that had already established a safety zone in the city itself. A junction between the Army and Marine forces took place on the morning of 3 May and a perimeter was set up.
POWER PACK IV, the fourth echelon of the 82d, consisted of the 1st Brigade with three airborne battalions and support forces with a total of 3,000 men an officers. It began to deploy from the United States on the shuttling aircraft on 3 May and completed its move to the Dominican Republic the following morning.
In the five day period between 29 April and 4 May, over 10,500 men of the 82d Division and supporting elements were airlifted into the Dominican Republic. Additional Army units with a strength of about 3,000 men including the remainder of the 82d Airborne Division, Special Forces troops, psychological warfare units, signal and transportation elements, arrived in the Dominican Republic prior to 9 May. Together with over 4,000 Marines and over 1,000 Air Force personnel, the U.S. Forces in the Dominican Republic established firm control of the corridor between the San Isidro Airfield and of the safety zone in Santo Domingo.
By 8 May U.S. forces in the island republic totaled 14,000 men, including paratroop units flown from the United States and Marines landed by Navy ships. The evening before, in a televised address, the President had said" "What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of communist conspirators." Later in the same address, he declared, "We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere."
USS Boxer (LPH-4) was acting as flagship for Amphibious Squadron 10 when she answered an urgent call on 25 April from the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. She steamed to the revolt-torn country to assist in the evacuating of U.S. and other nationals. On Tuesday, 27 April, 294 persons were brought aboard Boxer and were then transferred to USS Raleigh (LPD-1) on Wednesday morning. As the situation worsened, later that same day 705 additional persons were brought aboard. During the entire week Boxer evacuated more than 1,000 men, women and children from the island, administering medical aid, hospital facilities and food, and providing sleeping spaces.
More than 500 Marines from the Sixth Expeditionary Unit and Marine Helicopter Squadron 264, embarked in Boxer, were deployed to insure the safety of the evacuees. Men were berthed in the troop berthing areas, and the women and children in the officers' staterooms. After three days aboard Boxer they were transferred to adjoining ships, USS Ruchamkin (APD-89), Raleigh [LPD-1], and Wood County (LST-1178) for transit to San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Many evacuees had gone without food or water for three days, some lost contact with their children during their escape. One woman who arrived aboard was in tears because she was separated from her family. The tears quickly disappeared as she found her children - for the first time in two weeks - already safe aboard. Violence was present in all quarters of the city as shooting rang out from building after building. Many of the people, hearing that they might be evacuated to Navy ships, had gathered in the Embajador Hotel to await their evacuation. For a large number of these evacuees most of that day was spent lying on the ground, listening to the whine of bullets overhead.
After the transfer of the evacuees to San Juan, Boxer stood by off the coast of the island, continuing to lend support in the form of food and medical care, remaining prepared in case additional evacuees were flown abroad
Other Memories
The 82d Airborne Division's deployment to the Dominican Republic should not be taken as an isolated incident, but rather, as one in a series of flash points where West faced off against East and Mutually Assured Destruction was the referee. It is as a representative of the XVIII Airborne Corps that I wish to discuss one of the Caribbean flare-ups, the civil war in the Dominican Republic or OPERATION POWER PACK.
By January 1965 the United States was firmly committed to the ideological war with the Soviet Union. And by April, when the 82d was chosen to participate in OPERATION POWER PACK, the Army had changed from Pentomic or Battle Groups to ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions), which, with its brigaded battalions, was a much more flexible tool to counter communist aggression in various third-world nations. Now there would be a clear distinction made between conventional and nuclear operations. Mechanized infantry was introduced at battalion and division levels, and airmobility was facilitated in the 101st and 82d airborne divisions by the introduction of the helicopter. The 82d Airborne Division under ROAD would be able to rapidly configure itself for any contingency across the spectrum of conflict by adding to its common division base, various types of maneuver battalions in a building block fashion. And, lest we forget, the ROAD divisions were still capable of engaging in nuclear war with the newly fielded Davy Crockett weapon system.
President Johnson stated it most succinctly when he said, "No President seeks crises. They come to him unbidden, and in legions. While April 24, 1965 began calmly enough, President Johnson would soon be forced into a military confrontation in the Caribbean that he had avoided one year earlier over crises in Cuba and Panama. What had changed in just one year that was important enough to risk the loss of American lives and prestige in Latin America, and perhaps, invoke a nuclear war in Europe?
The answer rests with the American public opinion in 1965. President Johnson, was well aware that the American public would not stand for any political waffling on another Communist government in the Caribbean Basin, even if intervention meant earning a black eye from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the world at large. He said: "When I do what I am about to do, there'll be a lot of people in this hemisphere I can't live with, but if I don't do it there'll be a lot of people in this country I can't live with."
There were also geopolitical and strategic reasons why the United States was prepared to risk confronting Communist aggression in the Caribbean. By shifting the scene of conflict from Berlin to Santo Domingo, it gave both nuclear powers room to maneuver without immediate doomsday repercussions. While critics of the intervention would downplay the significance of the relatively small island of Hispaniola, the economic, geographic and military facts of the Caribbean Basin display a clear picture of why the United States was willing to risk letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle.
A statistical catalog of the region shows that 55% of the crude oil the United States used at that time and 45% of its imports and exports passed through the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. In the event of hostilities in the NATO Theater or the Persian Gulf, 60% of reinforcements and supplies needed to conduct operations would pass through these waters. The Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti was also a very important transit route for vital minerals such as manganese, nickel, bauxite, and iron ore. Despite the fact that many world leaders pooh-poohed the Domino Theory, if the United States had stood idly by and allowed Panama and the Dominican Republic to follow Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence, this would have put a major choke hold on the trade in that region. Not to mention the fact that their proximity to the American mainland could conceivably be used as forward staging bases for further Communist aggression. Jerome Slater, a vociferous critic of the Dominican intervention, did concede, "If one assumes, as I believe we must, that there are at least as many militant cold warriors in the Kremlin as in Washington, the price of non-action in the Caribbean might have been more aggressive Soviet behavior elsewhere, say Berlin or the Middle East.
President Johnson had shown his willingness to use diplomacy in the Panama and Cuban incidents, and it is likely that he would have preferred a collective security resolution to the April 1965 Dominican crisis, but what was lacking now, was time for political maneuvering. The rapid escalation from a not unexpected political coup to a totally unexpected civil war took just one day, and President Johnson heeded the advice of his Ambassador in Santo Domingo, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., that American lives were in danger. If local Dominican authorities could not provide protection, the United States would provide its own. Furthermore, stabilizing this region would also enable the United States to commit its power in southeast Asia without having to worry about the security of the Western Hemisphere.
However, before describing how fielding the 82d Airborne Division facilitated the achievement of National Command Authority objectives, it is necessary to give a brief overview of unfolding events in the Dominican Republic.
The CIA had briefed President Johnson of an impending coup, but assessments had it figured for the May or June time frame. LBJ was concerned that the thirty-year dictatorship of Leonidas Trujillo had left the Dominican Republic with a chronic inability to govern itself despite its first free election in 1962 after Trujillo's assassination. The 1962 election had put Juan Bosch in power, however, Bosch garnered the wrath of the military and conservative businessmen when he legalized Communist parties and appointed several liberals to his cabinet. Bosch sealed his own fate in September 1963 when he demanded the resignation of the most powerful of the Dominican generals, General Wessin y Wessin. Thus challenged, Wessin led a coup that captured Bosch in the presidential palace and sent him to exile in Puerto Rico. Wessin then declared that "The Communist doctrine, Marxist-Leninist, Castroite, or whatever it is called, is now outlawed." While Wessin y Wessin's declaration was a step in the right direction, the American President couldn't ignore the fact that the general had just overthrown the democratically elected president. By threatening to sever all US economic aid to the Dominican Republic, Wessin y Wessin was forced to form a three-man junta, with free elections to follow in September 1964, and return quietly to his role as commander of the training center.
Donald Reid y Cabral, who now found himself at the head of the junta, was a moderate and generally regarded as an honest man. Unfortunately, Reid came to office at a time when his country's economy was severely crippled by the failure of the sugar market, the major commodity the Dominican Republic relied on for foreign exchange. Reid was also unpopular with most of the high-ranking officers in the military for his attempt to cut back on their privileges. Reid suspected, and with good reason, that some or all of these officers would try to overthrow him in the spring of 1965.
Hoping to forestall a coup by going on the offensive, Reid, on April 24th, dispatched his Army Chief of Staff to cancel the commissions of four conspirators. The four officers not only failed to surrender, but seized the military camp northwest of Santo Domingo, and took the Chief of Staff prisoner. The coup caught the United States with its pants down. Relying on the intelligence assessments calling for a May or June showdown, the Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett Jr., had gone on vacation to visit his sick mother, and most of the US military mission members had been allowed to attend a military assistance conference in Panama. The only intelligence received on the progress of the coup was from the remaining Charge d'Affairs, William B. Connett, Jr., who wired the State Department that Reid would probably be able to get the support of the armed forces and remain in power.
By Sunday morning April 25, Reid's and Connett's estimations were dashed. In a lightening fast mobilization a mere one-half hour after the Chief of Staff's capture, the Soviet-oriented Dominican Revolutionary Party, and the Castroite 14th of June Revolutionary Party, put large numbers of armed civilians into the streets and created chaos. In an eerily similar scenario to what would occur in Haiti in September 1994, the Dominican national police were ill prepared or equipped to meet such brutal opposition from well-armed bands of teenagers (Los Tigres) who swarmed through Santo Domingo shooting any policemen they could find. The police abandoned their posts en masse, discarded their uniforms, and either disappeared into the crowds or sought sanctuary with Wessin y Wessin's forces in the eastern part of the city. The Dominican Popular Movement, a small by very active Communist party, now opened gas stations and distributed Molotov cocktails to the crowds, and the rebel military, well supplied with mortars, machine guns, bazookas and small arms established defensive positions at the Duarte Bridge.
In an attempt to keep the support of the military, Reid appointed General Wessin y Wessin Chief of the Armed Forces. Bosch, still in exile in Puerto Rico, was able to convince Jose Rafael Urena, a party leader, to become the Constitutionalist (rebel) provisional president until he could return to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican armed forces were adamantly opposed to the reinstatement of Bosch, and when word of this agreement between Bosch and Urena reached them, the service chiefs agreed to fight the rebels. They adopted the word Loyalist for their cause; they would be loyal to the Reid junta and opposed to the Constitutionalists. However, Reid was captured at the presidential palace by rebel forces commanded by Francisco Caamano Deno. General Wessin y Wessin now stepped into Reid's vacant position and became the de facto head of state.
By Monday, 26 April 1965, armed civilians, under the control of two major Communist parties, outnumbered the original rebel military regulars. Radio Santo Domingo, now fully under rebel control, began to call for more violent actions and for indiscriminate killing of policemen. Charge Connett was left in little doubt that the rebels were fully controlled by the Communist political parties, and began coordinating the evacuation plans for 3,500 American citizens living in the city.
Ambassador Bennett returned to Santo Domingo on 27 April with instructions to take charge of the evacuation and to influence the Loyalist Dominican military to use more forceful means to put down the revolt. Surprisingly, he was met at the Embassy by the Constitutionalist Provisional President Molina Urena and Colonel Caamano. The two rebel leaders asked for US intervention to stop the Dominican Air Force attacks on the rebel-held areas. Bennett refused thinking that the Loyalists were beginning to gain some ground over the rebels. Utterly dismayed by this rejection, Molina Urena relinquished his position as Provisional President to Colonel Caamano. In San Isidro, Loyalists generals chose Air Force Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit to head a new Loyalist junta.
On 28 April the Dominican Air Force resumed its bombing of rebel positions in Santo Domingo and armed rebel civilians overran a police station and summarily executed the policemen. Ambassador Bennett now cabled Washington that "collective madness" had engulfed Santo Domingo and asked about a possible introduction of armed US forces to protect Americans who had not been evacuated by US Marines on the 27th and, most importantly, to calm things down in the city. The high priority cable read, "I recommend that serious thought be given to armed intervention to restore order beyond a mere protection of lives. If the present loyalist efforts fail, the power will go to groups whose aims are identified with those of the Communist Party. We might have to intervene to prevent another Cuba."
The decision to intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic was Lyndon Johnson's personal decision. All civilian advisers had recommended against immediate intervention in the hopes that the Loyalist side could bring an end to the civil war. President Johnson, however, took the advice of Ambassador Bennett, who pointed out the inefficiency and indecisiveness of the Dominican military leaders. General Wessin y Wessin had done little or nothing for the last three, terror-filled days in Santo Domingo. Bennett suggested that the US interpose its forces between the rebels and those of the junta, thereby effecting a cease-fire. The United States could then ask the OAS to negotiate a political settlement between the opposing factions.
OPLAN 310/2-63 called for XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters to be activated and for two Army battalion combat teams to be air-dropped northeast of San Isidro Airfield. When notified on the night of April 26th to prepare his division for combat, General Robert York, Commander of the 82d Airborne Division, discovered some serious problems involving communications and existing operations plans.
The communication and coordination complexities of joint operations surfaced immediately. LANTCOM in Norfolk, Virginia and STRICOM at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida both owning a piece of this operation, began issuing competing orders to the 82d. This was never fully resolved but was somewhat alleviated when the Corps headquarters, upon arrival in Santo Domingo, established communications via C130 Talking Bird Aircraft directly to the Joint Chiefs. Critical information would go directly from Washington to Santo Domingo, with only administrative communications following formal channels through the Atlantic Command.
The other significant challenge facing the Corps and Division was the fact that neither XVIII Airborne Corps nor the 82d Airborne Division had received the updated LANTCOM contingency plans. This meant that the Corps' plan did not have up-to-date troop lists, while the 82d's did not even reflect the current ROAD configuration, but called for the deployment of two or three battle groups, the main combat element for the now defunct pentomic division. This also meant that the table of organization and equipment attached to the plan was inaccurate. Finally, none of the plans allowed for the possibility that an entire division might have to deploy to the Dominican Republic.
General York quickly determined that, in the absence of a plan, the first order of business was to craft a mission statement for the operation. The plan became an airdrop on San Isidro Airfield, expansion westward to the Duarte Bridge, and follow-on assistance to the evacuation order. This plan was surprisingly accurate given the fact that General York received only the sketchiest of intelligence on the identity, status, and location of friendly and unfriendly forces, and the location of key facilities in Santo Domingo.
At 1630 on Thursday, 29 April, General York was ordered to deploy the Division's Third Brigade (508th PIR) to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico. Two hours into the operation, General York was ordered to bypass Ramey and airland at San Isidro. This was a case of good news/bad news. The good news was the change from airdrop to airland for it meant that the Division would not suffer casualties on the San Isidro drop zone which was covered in sharp coral outcroppings. The bad news was the paratroopers would have to off-load heavy equipment rigged for parachute drop sans material handling equipment. This slowed things down considerably and forced the C130s to rack and stack to await their turn to off load.
After meeting with his Naval and Marine counterparts in country, York's plan was a battalion-size advance from the airfield to secure the Duarte Bridge and establish a strongpoint controlling the western approach to the bridge. This would form a line running northeast from the embassy area to the Ozama River. The Marines in the embassy area would hold the left flank, Loyalist troops would form the center and the Division would hold the right flank thereby dividing the city in half. The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, supported by Marine F-4 Phantoms, moved in two columns to secure the Duarte Bridge. It was at the Duarte Bridge that the division encountered a rather unusual problem. Since the Constitutionalists, who had defected from the military, and the Loyalists military wore the same uniform, it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe or as one Marine put it: "It's bad enough we can't tell a good guy from a bad guy, but on top of that they're all over the place!" The 82d's field expedient solution was to have the Loyalist military wear their hats backwards or to the side.
Establishing a bridgehead and securing the area around it was a perilous operation requiring house-to-house searches while under sniper and automatic weapons fire. By mid-afternoon the bridge was secure to include the 1st Battalion of the 505th's capture of Santo Domingo's main power station and the establishment of a position atop an eight-story silo overlooking the rebel stronghold in Ciudad Nuevo. The entire operation had only resulted in five paratrooper casualties, none of them fatalities.
If General York's original plan had run true, the junta troops would now begin patrolling the area between the 82d and the marines. Instead, the Loyalists with all equipment, returned to San Isidro. Until York received the requested four additional combat teams and permission to close the gap between the Army and the Marines, the plan to isolate the majority of the rebel forces in Ciudad Nuevo would have to be put on hold. While the Joint Chiefs okayed the additional troops, they could not get President Johnson's permission for the troops to advance across Santo Domingo. President Johnson was concerned that the additional show of force would give the OAS delegates more reason to vilify the United States. This subornation of military objectives to the State Department's concern about world opinion would haunt the entire operation. Seen retrospectively, this type of presidential decision (overruling solid principles of war to try and placate world opinion) did not portend well for traditional US military missions, and set up President Johnson for failure in Vietnam.
By mid afternoon of April 30th, a cease-fire, facilitated by the Papal Nuncio, was negotiated among all the principals despite the fact that Ambassador Bennett believed it unwise to agree to a cease-fire while the rebels still controlled most of Santo Domingo.
After only one day of intervention, President Johnson was coming under serious sniping of his own. The angry reaction of the OAS delegates, the press, and several notable members of the Senate and Congress, made him determined to end the hue and cry as quickly as possible. Deeming it less politically damaging to end the intervention quickly by overwhelming power projection, LBJ ordered General Wheeler to get the "best general in the Pentagon" to be the commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic. General Wheeler chose LTG Bruce R. Palmer, Jr. for that role with the stated mission of protecting American lives and property, and the unstated mission of preventing another Cuba. The last order General Wheeler gave to Palmer was probably issued with an eye to the political repercussions caused by the military intervention. General Palmer was to seek out the US Ambassador and "stick to him like a burr." General Palmer, who had been slated to assume command of the XVIII Airborne Corps in a few months, was ordered to leave for Fort Bragg immediately, pick up a bare-bones headquarters with communications support from the Corps, and fly posthaste to Santo Domingo. Taking his instructions seriously, Palmer arrived at the San Isidro airfield shortly after midnight in the first minutes of 1 May.
What disturbed Palmer the most was the fact that, under the current cease-fire, US forces would have to live with the gap between the Army and Marine positions. The rebels had initiated a reign of terror and anarchy in Ciudad Nuevo and were able to move at will to reinforce their positions and to snipe at his troops in this gap. They were also using captured Radio Santo Domingo very effectively to incite crowds to further violence. On the other hand, the Loyalist troops under Wessin y Wessin had retreated across the Duarte Bridge to the San Isidro Airfield. Of the 30,000 Dominican soldiers, airmen and police at the start of the civil war, General Wessin now commanded less than 2,400 troops and only 200 national police. This was militarily unacceptable. A corridor had to be established between the two US positions. At 0900 on 1 May the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry sent a task force across the Duarte Bridge to see if contact could be made with the Marines in the International Security Zone, approximately two and a half kilometers away. By 1315 hours they had successfully linked up with the Marines, but had incurred the first 82d combat KIA since World War II. The successful linkup encouraged Palmer to ask the Joint Chiefs for permission to close the gap permanently.
President Johnson approved General Palmer's plan with the proviso that Palmer gain the approval of the five-member OAS commission overseeing conditions in Santo Domingo. The commission agreed on the grounds that closing the gap would provide a land route for resupply and evacuation from the International Security Zone to the airfield at San Isidro. The operation began at one minute past midnight on May 3. Using a leapfrog method, the 82d encountered only light resistance and made contact with the marines one hour and fourteen minutes later.
This Line of Communication (LOC) would be dubbed the All American Expressway by the 82d, and General York delivered a blatant psychological message to rebel troops by marching the 82d Airborne Division Band "All the Way" through this sniper infested corridor. The LOC allowed paratroopers to begin distributing food, water and medicine to the city's residents regardless of political affiliation. It also improved the military situation in that it split the rebel forces trapping the majority of Caamano's troops in Ciudad Nuevo. Most importantly however, the LOC ended any chance that either the Constitutionalists or the Loyalists could take control of the country by military means--both sides would be forced to negotiate a political end to the civil war. With the threat of the Dominican Republic's turning into another Cuba removed, the US was able to turn its forces from military peacemaking to the more political realm of stabilization and negotiation. On May 5th, just seven days after the first 82d paratrooper landed at San Isidro, the Act of Santo Domingo was signed by Colonel Benoit (Loyalist), Colonel Caamano (Constitutionalist) and the OAS Special Committee. The Act provided for a general cease-fire, recognition of the International Security Zone, agreement to assist relief agencies, and the sanctity of diplomatic missions. While the Act set the framework for later negotiations, it failed to stop all of the fighting. Snipers still shot at US forces, however, major fire fights between Dominican factions did subside for a time.
Denied a military victory, the rebels quickly shifted to political-propaganda tactics by having a Constitutionalist "congress" elect Caamano "president" of the country. US officials countered by backing General Imbert, a national hero for his role in the assassination of Trujillo. On May 7th, Imbert was sworn in as president of the Government of National Reconstruction. The next step in the stabilization process, as envisioned by Washington and the OAS, was to arrange an agreement between President Caamano and President Imbert to form a provisional government committed to early elections. However, Caamano refused to meet with Imbert until several of the Loyalist officers were made to leave the country. Most notable of these was Wessin y Wessin. LBJ's personal emissary, John Bartlow Martin, suspected that radical elements within the Loyalists were deliberately trying to sabotage any political solution.
In a move that caught almost everyone by surprise, the cease-fire was shattered not by Colonel Caamano, but by General Imbert who began Operation LIMPIEZA (Cleanup) on 13 May. Contrary to initial American expectations, General Imbert's forces were successful in eliminating pockets of rebel resistance outside Ciudad Nuevo and silencing Radio Santo Domingo. Operation CLEANUP ended on 21 May when General Imbert's forces reached the LOC to the south and the Ozama River on the east.
By mid-May, a majority of the OAS voted for Operation PUSH AHEAD, the reduction of United States forces and their replacement by an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). The first contingent to arrive was a rifle company from Honduras which was soon backed by detachments from Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Brazil provided the largest unit, a full reinforced infantry battalion commanded by Brigadier General Hugo Alvim. Alvim assumed command of the OAS ground forces, and on 26 May, the United States began withdrawing its forces. Since the Marines had been first in country, they would be the first to leave.
For those All Americans remaining in country, peacekeeping duties would be a severe test of their discipline, personal courage, and ability to only apply force when absolutely necessary. Rules of Engagement would now be generated with an eye on more diplomatic than military considerations. Combat operations would be defensive in nature and soldiers would have to engage in activities normally performed by civilian agencies. An excerpt from the 307th Engineer record of their time in Santo Domingo gives a clear impression of what the combat soldier felt about these new restrictions.
�?�"We couldn't fire until we were fired upon, we would hand out food to the people one minute and then be engaged in a fire-fight with the same ones the next�?�Clean up the streets, hell--we came here to fight!�?�Many times we had to drop our shovels and dive for cover as the sporadic fire from rebel rifles started hitting all around us."
After the May 21st cease-fire, General Palmer began to place a greater emphasis on civil affairs, humanitarian aid and enforcing neutrality. However, distributing food and clothing brought the Marines and paratroopers into close contact with Dominicans from both political parties, and some friction between US military and the Dominicans was inevitable. For one thing, the US soldiers were seen increasingly as an army of occupation, especially when they were used to break up public demonstrations. This is where the 82d's experience in riot control discipline came in handy. The All Americans were one of the few units that had yearly riot control practice. They also had previous experience in maintaining discipline before angry mobs, having been used in desegregation disputes in Oxford, Mississippi and Detroit, Michigan. And it became increasingly evident that the soldiers would have to be very disciplined to obey the Rules of Engagement.
The order not to fire unless fired on or in imminent danger of being overrun was imposed on the US soldiers due to the politicians' fears that too much aggressiveness on the part of the military would lead to a breakdown in diplomatic initiatives. It was unfortunate for the paratroopers who found themselves bound by these rules that once the rebels learned of the no fire order they increased their confrontations. To avoid becoming sniper fatalities, the troopers moved tactical operations from the street to the rooftop level. Rebel snipers caused most of the American fatalities--13 KIA and 200 WIA for the All Americans. The 7mm bolt-action Mauser rifle used by the rebels had very definite advantages over the newly fielded American M-16. It had greater range and its higher caliber passed easily through the lumber and concrete block construction common in Santo Domingo, while the M-16 was prone to jam frequently and lacked telescopic sights. The paratroopers countered this ballistic handicap with characteristic ingenuity. It didn't take them long to figure out that while doctrine might dictate buildings be cleared from the top down, doing so in Santo Domingo would earn you a one-way ticket home in a body bag. If taller buildings overshadowed a key objective, it would be cleared from the bottom up, with adequate covering fire to discourage the ever-vigilant snipers. Adequate covering fire included the 106-mm recoilless rifle, which had the advantage of not only killing the sniper but also destroying the building that had concealed him. Through admirable fire control the All-Americans quickly turned sniping into a suicide mission.
It was this restraint, perhaps, that proved to be the key to obtaining the Constitutionalists and Loyalists signatures on the OAS-sponsored Act of Reconciliation in August. Now, from a peak strength of 24,000 in May of 1965, the US could safely begin redeploying the marines and paratroopers who helped engineer this rapprochement of brother with brother. The last All American would leave the Dominican Republic in September 1966 after Joaquin Balaguer was sworn in as the freely elected President.
POWER PACK, as the first real deployment under the ROAD concept of tailoring a force for its mission, STRICOM mobility and Flexible Response, demonstrated that the United States could move rapidly, and forcefully when it believed its national or hemispheric interests were in jeopardy. Moreover, it showed that while deploying maximum force to get the job done quickly, those forces were disciplined enough to use only the minimum or appropriate force for the situation.
President Johnson was also successful in achieving the majority of his stated political goals: preventing loss of any American civilian lives, preventing a Communist takeover so close to home, creating an Inter-American Peace Force as a tool for stabilizing the Caribbean, and establishing a climate for free elections in the Dominican Republic. The military, however, would chafe at his restricted, top down, political management. But, during the middle years of the Cold War, it was unrealistic to think that Washington would give a nuclear capable military free reign to accomplish the mission. Despite this contretemps, the Dominican affair also set a precedent for close civilian-military relations at high decision-making levels. By having the senior US commander establish a close working relationship with the US ambassador on the spot, appropriate political-military tactics were employed.
Another successful political-military technique used in Santo Domingo was the separation of the senior military headquarters from the tactical commander directing the operations. This permitted a seamless transmission of political-military guidance and relieved the tactical commander from bearing the brunt of having to explain to his troops decisions made due to political constraints. In this case, Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps took the senior military position of Headquarters US Forces Dominican Republic, while Headquarters 82d Airborne Division was selected to be the tactical force.
This operation would also establish patterns and uncover common problems for future contingency operations that would prove to be disastrous if left unheeded or uncorrected in the areas of joint interoperability, communications, intelligence collection, and, in particular, civil-military end states. For while military intervention can stabilize conditions it cannot alone solve political problems; much less correct inherent social and economic inequalities.
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Reserve Forces Meritorious Service Medal is awarded for exemplary behavior, efficiency, and fidelity during a three year period while serving in an enlisted status in the Air Reserve Forces. ... The Air Reserve Forces Meritorious Service Medal is awarded for exemplary behavior, efficiency, and fidelity during a three year period while serving in an enlisted status in the Air Reserve Forces. MoreHide
Criteria The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, after July 1, 1958, participate in specified United States operations or those in direct support of the United Natio... The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal is awarded to members of the Armed Forces who, after July 1, 1958, participate in specified United States operations or those in direct support of the United Nations or friendly foreign nations MoreHide
Criteria Established in June 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the truce in Palestine called for by the Security Council. Since its inception, UNTSO has performed various task... Established in June 1948 to assist the Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the truce in Palestine called for by the Security Council. Since its inception, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. At present, UNTSO assists and cooperates with UNDOF and UNIFIL in the performance of their tasks; observer groups are stationed in Beirut and in Cairo with liaison offices in Amman and Gaza City. UNTSO also provided cadres of Military Observers for the initial set-up of UNGOMAP, UNIMOG, UNIKOM and UNPROFOR. MoreHide
Description The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the Caribbean Crisis or the Missile Scare, was a 13-day (October 16–28, 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning American bThe Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the Caribbean Crisis or the Missile Scare, was a 13-day (October 16–28, 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning American ballistic missile deployment in Italy and Turkey with consequent Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. The confrontation, elements of which were televised, was the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war.
In response to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, and the presence of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to agree to Cuba's request to place nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter future harassment of Cuba. An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in July 1962 and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer.
The 1962 midterm elections were under way in the United States and the White House had denied charges that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 miles from Florida. These missile preparations were confirmed when an Air Force U-2 spy plane produced clear photographic evidence of medium-range (SS-4) and intermediate-range (R-14) ballistic missile facilities. The United States established a military blockade to prevent further missiles from entering Cuba. It announced that they would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the USSR.
After a long period of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached between President John F. Kennedy and Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a U.S. public declaration and agreement never to invade Cuba again without direct provocation. Secretly, the United States also agreed that it would dismantle all U.S.-built Jupiter MRBMs, which were deployed in Turkey and Italy against the Soviet Union but were not known to the public.
When all offensive missiles and Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was formally ended on November 20, 1962. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and direct communication line between Washington and Moscow. As a result, the Moscow–Washington hotline was established. A series of agreements sharply reduced U.S.–Soviet tensions during the following years.... More
People You Remember
I was with the 71st T.C.S
Memories I was on the runway in NC wanting for the call from JFK.. And also able to go into the war room for I was on the runway in NC wanting for the call from JFK.. And also able to go into the war room for planing. ... More
Best Friends
Hello To all who visit this site. My father has passed away and I'm trying to put all his military orders together. He has kept almost every order dating back to when he enlisted with the Army Air Force Cadets. The site is not done. The Family
Chain of Command
Tactical Air Command School, Standardization Evaluation 4450th Langley Air Base.
Other Memories
Tactical Air Command School Standardization Evaluation, with 4450th Langley AFB Virgina
Criteria The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospital... The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and medical centers (whether or not they are numbered) for exceptionally meritorious service or exceptionally outstanding achievement that clearly sets the unit above and apart from similar units. Heroism may be involved, but is not essential. MoreHide
Criteria
The Combat Readiness Medal is awarded to military service members after August 1, 1960, for sustained individual combat or mission readiness or preparedness for direct weapon system employment.
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Chain of Command
History of the Strategic Air Command Page 6 - 1950-53
The Korean War Initial Deployment On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, thus starting the Korean War. President Harry Truman quickly committed American support to South Korea and the United States bungled it's way into the conflict. "It is the wrong war, in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong enemy," declared General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the close of World War II, the United States had thrown away its vast military power and military appropriations had been reduced to almost nothing. The Berlin Crises of 1948 demonstrated the stupidity of the unilateral disarmament and B-29s were hastily brought back into service. However the new Strategic Air Command had but a small fraction of the forces that the US strategic air forces had at the end of the war. In spite of these limitations, SAC was quick to respond. The 31st Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Reconnaissance Group, was then temporarily deployed at Kadena AB, Okinawa. It quickly moved to Yokota AB to shorten mission time. The 19th Bomb Group was then stationed at North Field, Guam, but quickly deployed to a forward base. The 31st Recon Squadron immediately began flying combat reconnaissance missions. Results were passed on to the 19th, which sprung into action. On the night of June 28th - only three days after the outbreak of the war - their B-29s struck enemy bridges, trucks, tanks and supply columns. This was the first use of SAC's combat power. During the next month, the 31st Squadron flew 31 missions. On July 3, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF Chief of Staff ordered the 2nd and 92nd Bombardment Wings to deploy to the Far East. On the 5th, the 19th Bombardment Group relocated northward to Kadena, Okinawa to reduce the distance to their targets. Three days later, the 92nd Bombardment Group deployed from Spokane AFB (later Fairchild) to Yokota AB, Japan. The 22nd Bombardment Group departed March AFB, California on July 13 to join the 19th at Kadena AB, Okinawa. Fifty B-29s from the 19th, 22nd and 92nd Bombardment Groups struck the port of Wonsan, North Korea on July 13, 1950. They dropped over 500 tons of high explosive in the Wonsan Oil Refinery, dock areas and marshaling yards. It was the first major strike of the conflict. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. As commander of the Japan Occupation forces, it was intimate aware of the devastation done by American B-29s during World War II, when Japanese cites were fire-bombed by over 500 fortresses at a time. He had only a tenth as many and wanted more. He readily accepted an offer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for two additional bombardment groups. The 98th Bombardment Group, stationed at Spokane AFB, was scheduled to make a permanent change of station (PCS) to Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico. The 307th Bombardment Group was stationed at MacDill AFB, Florida. On August 1, both were deployed to Kadena. This was an incredibly rapid response, especially when compared to the American response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a decade earlier. Far East Air Forces (FEAF) SAC now had five B-29s equipped bombardment groups and one reconnaissance squadron stationed in the Far East. They were assigned to the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), which was established on July 8, 1950. It was assigned the 5th, 13th and 20th Air Forces, and the Far East Air Material Command. It was commanded by General George E. Stratemeyer, but Major General Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell Jr. was chief of FEAF Bomber Command. FEAF was distinct from SAC and under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SAC continued to control all the bomber forces in the ZI (Zone of Interior - i.e., the United States) Between July 30 and August 5, the Superfortress virtually eliminated the huge Koman (Hungham) chemical-industrial complex with more than 1,200 tons of bombs dropped during three missions. Other targets included the port and dock areas of Chongjin (Sheishim); Cinnempo industrial area; Haeji ammunition storage area; Songjin magnesium plant, Suchow hydro-electric plant, Pyongyang arsenal and marshalling yard; and Seoul marshalling yards, and locomotive and rail car manufacturing plant. FEAT Bomber Command lost four B29s during the campaign. Close Air Support of Ground Troops The B-29 was conceived and designed as a strategic bomber. It's mission was to destroy an enemy's ability and will to wage war. It's primary targets were industrial and transportation centers. This concept was first advanced by General Billy Mitchell during the 1920's, but was rejected by army brass, who saw the airplane as a tactical weapon, one that should be used to support ground troops. The difference in the two concept was once compared to a cow and a bucket of milk. Tactical bombing is intended to kick over the bucket. Strategic bombing is out to kill the cow. General MacArthur was from the old school and saw the B-29 as airborne artillery. This resulted in ninety eight B-29s dropping 859 tons of bombs in a saturation raid on a 3 x 7 mile rectangular area, north of Weagan, North Korea on August 16. An estimated 40,000 enemy troops were in the area. This was SAC's first massive close air support mission. One it would often repeat in Vietnam. Strategic Bombing FEAF had identified and designated eighteen strategic targets in North Korea. By September 15, all had been neutralized. A total of 30,000 tons of bombs were dropped in about 4,000 stories against both strategic and tactical targets. FEAF's B-29s had systematic destroyed almost every important industrial target in North Korea with the first few weeks of operations. By late 1950, the B-29s were out of targets. On November 4, the 98th Bombardment Group's B-29s were unable to strike their primary target at Kanggye due to cloud cover. They went on to Chongjin, which was their secondary target and dropped their incendiary bombs. It was the first use of such bombs in Korea by FEAT. The bad weather continued. The next day the 19th Bombardment Group was unable to attack it's primary targets at Sakchu and Pukchin, but went on Kanggye, it's secondary target. It dropped 170 tons of incendiaries, destroying 65% of the target which was a large ammunition storage and communication center. Bombing Restrictions President Harry S. Truman feared drawing the Chinese into the conflict and the Joint Chief of Staff prohibited the B-29s from flying across the Yalu River. On November 6, the President and the JCS forbidding bombing within five miles of the Korean / Manchurian border. As the B-29s flew increasingly close to the Yalu, they encountered antiaircraft opposition and began spotting Mig-15s. The Chinese began testing their weapons and training, which had been provided by the Soviets. The restrictions were lifted. Bridge Bombing General MacArthur wanted to stop the flow of men and supplies into Korea from Manchuria. On November 8, FEAF dispatched a daylight raid of 79 B29s to hit the Sinuiju supply and communication center. Sinuiju was on the far western edge of Korea, just across the Yalu River from Antung, Manchuria. It was anticipated that the city would be well defended by flak batteries. Fifth Air Force F-51 Mustangs attacked antiaircraft positions with rockets, napalm and machine guns, while F-80 Shooting Stars provided fighter cover. Russian MiG-15s took off from Antung to the engage the fighters. This resulted in the first air battle between jet aircraft. The MiG was a superior aircraft, but the Chinese pilots lacked training and experience. A F-80 pilot fired along burst from his six 50 caliber machines guns, resulting in the first MiG shot down in Korea. Just before noon, seventy of the B-29s unleashed over 584 tons of 500-lb incendiary bombs, while the other nine bombers from (from the19th Bomb Group) dropped 1,000-lb bombs on the abutments and bridge approaches. The fighters had effectively suppressed the flak batteries on the southern side of the target, but the ones on the Manchurian side opened up with a heavy barrage as the bombers approached. The B-29s came in above 18,000 feet and flew in tight squadron formation to minimize time over target. Pre and post strike photography revealed that the incendiaries had burned about 60% of the two-square mile built up area in Sinuiju. The bridge approaches were damaged, but the spans were still standing. Three navy aircraft carriers launched planes against the bridges over a course of three days beginning November 9th. They were able to take out the highway bridge and two lesser bridge up river at Hyesanjin, but the heavily-constructed railroad bridge survived all their attacks. The aircraft carriers withdrew and the b-29s were sent in once again. On November 14, the 98th Bombardment Group sent in nine of it's B-29s to drop 1,000 bombs on the bridge. The next day, a combined force of 21 B-29s from the 19th and 30th struck the bridge again. The bombers fought off attacking MiGs and dropped their bombs on target. Heavy flak and a 95 mph cross wind made the bombing difficult and little damage was done. A pair of B-29 sustained battle damage. General MacArthur called off the attack, maintaining that the Sinuiju bridge was too strongly defended to risk further aircraft and air crews. B-29s from the19th, 98th, and 30th Bombardment Groups attacked other bridges on November 24, but failed to achieve satisfactory results. The next day, eight B-29s from the 19th Bomb Group dropped one span of the Manpojin Railway Bridge. On the following day, eight bombers from the 30th Bombardment Group destroyed two spans of the Chongsongjin highway Bridge. Subsequent command attacks by Air Force and Navy Aircraft had cut almost half of the international bridges between Manchuria and Korea during the month of November to no effect. The ingenious North Koreans and Chinese soon laid pontoon bridges in their place. Winter brought freezing weather and soon the Yalu was covered with ice hard enough to support vehicles. Japanese railway engineers told FEAT intelligence officers that the ice was thick enough to support heavy weights and that they had one laid a rail line across such ice. A TDY RB-29 from the 92nd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was shot down while on an operational mission near the Yalu River on November 9, 1950. It was the units first combat loss of the war. The beginning of Smart Bombs It is very difficult to get a bomb on target. When it leaves the aircraft, it has more forward than downward motion; it then begins to drop. This results in a trajectory arc. As it falls, it is subjected to cross winds, which can vary at different altitudes. The further it has to fall, the more difficult it becomes to hit a target. The B-29s were built to attack large targets from high altitude, not small tactical targets. The Korean bridges were narrow and very difficult to hit. The B-29s dropped their bombing altitude to 10,000 feet in hopes of achieving higher bombing accuracy. This made them easier targets for intense anti-aircraft fire. They dropped an average of four bombs per bomb run and made several runs over the target. FEAF determined that it took over thirteen bomb runs to destroy an average bridge. The MiG-15 Fagot soon arrived and drove the B-29s to altitudes of 21,000 feet. With the technology then available, it was next to impossible to hit a target only twenty or twenty-five wide from four miles high. Plus, the MiGs prevented the bombers from making more than one pass over the target. In an effort to improve bombing results, they began dropping 2,00 lb bombs. During the fall of 1950, the 19th Bombardment Groups began experimenting with the 1,000-lb RAZON (Range and AZimuth ONly bombs.) They had movable fins which responded to radio commands from the bombardier. This was the first nattempt to guide bombs to a target, rather than have them simply fall. It was a good idea, but there were many malfunctions. Only 331 out of the first 487 RAZON bombs responded to the radio commands; a 67% success rate! A technical team from the Air Proving Ground Command worked closely with the air and ground crews. the last 150 RAZONs had a 97% reliability rate and fifteen bridge were destroyed. It required an average of only four RAZON bomb to destroy an average bridge. A new TARZON bomb was introduced in December, 1950. It was based on the huge 12,000-lb British Tall Boy, which permitted control of both azimuth and roll. Ten bombs were dropped, but only one scored a hit. Crews of the 19th Bombardment Group continued to train with them and by March 1951 had become quite skilled in their use. On Mach 29, 1951, three TARZON equipped B-29s were ordered to bomb the stubborn Sinuiju bridge, the one that had defied so many earlier attacks. One aircraft returned with mechanical problems, a second ditched at sea and exploded on impact, but the third proceeded to target, only to miss. It was later surmised the explosion on ditching had been caused by the bomb and the TARZON program was cancelled. .
Other Memories
Air reserve technicians, commonly referred to as ARTs, are a nucleus of managers, planners and trainers who have knowledge and expertise to smooth Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units' transition from a peacetime to a wartime environment. They provide management continuity, equipment maintenance and training support to help keep their units combat ready. Air reserve technicians carry dual status, working as full-time civil service employees for the Air Force and as military members in the same AFRC units where they work as civilians and performing the same job. In their civilian role, air reserve technicians provide full-time support throughout the month for their units. In the AFRC, air reserve technicians participate with other reservists on weekends and annual active-duty tours. Their jobs span a broad spectrum, including commander, flight instructor, aircraft mechanic, nurse, aircraft maintenance officer, loadmaster and personnel officer. ARTs comprise approximately 17 percent of the AFRC unit manpower with aircraft maintenance employing about 60 percent of the technician work force, where they average 17 years of job experience. The program was implemented in 1958 as the result of a study, which showed that reservists could be trained by fewer air reserve technicians than by full-time active duty personnel. The air reserve technician program saved the Air Force $13 million during its first year of operation. There are approximately 9,600 technicians assigned in the AFRC.
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria The Armed Forces Reserve Medal is awarded to United States Armed Forces Reserve component members (or former members) who complete (or have completed) a total of ten years service. This service need n... The Armed Forces Reserve Medal is awarded to United States Armed Forces Reserve component members (or former members) who complete (or have completed) a total of ten years service. This service need not be consecutive, if it was performed within a period of twelve consecutive years. For the purpose of this award service as a member of a Reserve component MoreHide
In january 1957, he was called to Active duty for two weeks of Transitioning in the 434th T.C.W newly acquired C-119s. this gave him the distinction of being the first reserve Pilot in our Wing to check out. March 1957, Herbert was recalled to active duty and spent six days at Pope Air Force Base South Carolina, receiving the Basic Course of the C-119 simulator. After completing the M.T.D. Course, May 30,1957 He was asked to stay on at Pope Air Force Base as Flight Instructor and performed Instructor duties in the C-119 Aircraft-consisting of teaching Instrument and Transition Flying until August 1957 This gave him the opportunity to train future Instructor Pilots for the Air Reserve Flying Centers within the Tenth Air force also ,to instruct Reserve Pilots from various Reserve Wings who were station at Bakalar Air Force Base for their summer encampment. The sixteen months in which he has been instructing Instruments,Transition and Troop Carrier Tactics in the C-119 Aircraft At Bakalar, has give him the opportunity to ride with and known a number of pilots assigned to the 434th T.C.W.
C-119 Flying Boxcar
Role Military transport aircraft Manufacturer Fairchild Aircraft First flight November 1947 Introduced December 1949 Retired 1974 Primary user United States Air Force Produced 1949-1955 Number built 1,183 Developed from C-82 Packet Variants XC-120 Packplane Fairchild AC-119
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Best Moment
I got to be home when my 2nd child was born and it was my oldest daughter Diane. My first born was my oldest son Wayne. I was in Korea at the time of his birth.
Worst Moment
They lost my paper work which cause a lapse of two weeks in service. it was good to be home from War.
Chain of Command
Upon receiving Honorable Separation from the service In Jan.1953.I was again assigned to the 434th T.C.W. in November 1953. My duties were to teach Transition,Instrument flying, Troop Carrier Tactics in the C-46. From May 1954 to Dec 1956.I was a member of the 434th T.C.W Standardization Broad. I then served as acting Operations officer for the 71st T.C.S.from June 1955 to August 1955,and Assistant operations officer from December 1954 to November 1955.
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United... The United Nations Korean Medal was generally awarded for any period of service while assigned as a member of the Armed Forces dispatched to Korea or adjacent areas for service on behalf of the United Nations. Service in qualifying organizations had to be certified by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief as having directly supported military operations in Korea. In the case of the United States, such certification was issued in General Orders 31 (June 20, 1955); General Orders 33 (July 11, 1955); and General Orders 36 (July 13, 1955). MoreHide
Description The military stalemate continued throughout the winter of 1952-1953. Allied Sabrejet pilots, meantime, persisted in destroying MiGs at a decidedly favorable ratio. In December the Communists developedThe military stalemate continued throughout the winter of 1952-1953. Allied Sabrejet pilots, meantime, persisted in destroying MiGs at a decidedly favorable ratio. In December the Communists developed an ambush tactic against F-86 pilots patroling along the Yalu River: MiG pilots would catch the UN aircraft as they ran short of fuel and headed south to return to base. During these engagements, some of the F-84 pilots exhausted their fuel and had IO bail out over Cho-do Island, 60 miles southwest of Pyongyang.
United Nations forces held the island and maintained an air rescue detachment there for such emergencies. To avoid combat while low on fuel, Sabre pilots began to fly home over the Yellow Sea. MiG pilots at this time generally sought the advantages of altitude, speed, position, and numbers before engaging in aerial combat. The UN pilots, on the other hand, relied on their skills to achieve aerial victories, even though they were outnumbered and flying aircraft that did not quite match the flight capabilities of the MiG-15s.
One memorable battle occurred on February l8, 1953, near the Sui-ho Reservoir on the Yalu River, 110 miles north of Pyongyang; 4 F-86Fs attacked 48 MiGs, shot down 2, and caused 2 others to crash while taking evasive action. All 4 U.S. aircraft returned safely to their base. While the Fifth Air Force maintained air superiority over North Korea during daylight hours, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command on nighttime missions ran afoul of increasingly effective Communist interceptors. The aging B- 29s relied on darkness and electronic jamming for protection from both interceptors and antiaircraft gunfire, but the Communists used spotter aircraft and searchlights to reveal bombers to enemy gun crews and fighter-interceptor pilots.
As B-29 losses mounted in late 1952, the Bomber Command compressed bomber formations to shorten the time over targets and increase the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures. The Fifth Air Force joined the Navy and Marines to provide fighter escorts to intercept enemy aircraft before they could attack the B-29s. Bomber Command also restricted.missions along the Yalu to cloudy, dark nights because on clear nights contrails gave away the bombers' positions. FEAF lost no more B-29s after January 1953, although it continued its missions against industrial targets. On March 5 the B-29s penetrated deep into enemy territory to bomb a target at Chongjin in northeastern Korea, only 63 miles from the Soviet border. While Bomber Command struck industrial targets throughout North Korea during the winter of 1952-1953, the Fifth Air Force cooperated with the U.S. Navy's airmen in attacks on supplies, equipment, and troops near the from fines.
In December 1952 the Eighth Army moved its bombline from 10,000 to 3,000 meters from the front lines, enabling Fifth Air Force and naval fighter-bombers to target areas closer to American positions. Beyond the front lines, the Fifth Air Force focused on destroying railroads and bridges, allowing B-26s to bomb stalled vehicles. In January 1953 the Fifth Air Force attempted to cut the 5 railroad bridges over the Chongchon Estoary near Sinanju, 40 miles north of Pyongyang. Expecting trains to back up in marshaling yards at Sinanju, Bomber Command sent B-29s at night to bomb them, but these operations hindered enemy transportation only briefly.
As the ground thawed in the spring, however, the Communist forces had greater difficulty moving supplies and reinforcements in the face of the Fifth Air Force's relentless attacks on transportation. At the end of March 1953, the Chinese Communist government indicated its willingness to exchange injured and ill prisoners of war and discuss terms for a cease-fire in Korea. On April 20 Communist and United Nations officials began an exchange of POWs, and 6 days later, resumed the sessions at Panmunjom. ... More
People You Remember
Col Black,Dwey Able and many more.
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while partic... The Air Medal may be awarded to individuals who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service while participating in aerial flight, but not of a degree that would justify an award of the Distinguished Flying Cross. MoreHide
Criteria The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or aft... The Presidential Unit Citation may be awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after December 7, 1941. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Criteria To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignm... To be eligible for this medal, the Service member must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities (June 25, 1950) and the date the armistice was signed (July 27, 1953); Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for thirty consecutive days or sixty non-consecutive days, and Performed duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operation or in support of combat operations. MoreHide
Description USAF offtcials recognized the need for more F-86s to counter the Chinese Air Force in Korea. The 51st Fighter-Interceptor
Wing at Suwon Airfield, 15 miles south of Seoul, consequently received F-86s fUSAF offtcials recognized the need for more F-86s to counter the Chinese Air Force in Korea. The 51st Fighter-Interceptor
Wing at Suwon Airfield, 15 miles south of Seoul, consequently received F-86s from the United States to replace its F-80s. On December 1, 1951, the wing flew its first combat missions in the new Sabrejets. Members of the 51st and 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wings shattered the Communists' air offensive, downing 26 MiGs in 2 weeks, while losing only 6 F-
86s. The Sabrejets achieved in the air the results that eluded the B-29s that bombed the enemy airfields near Pyongyang.
For the rest of the winter, the MiG pilots generally avoided aerial combat; nevertheless, Fifth Air Force pilots between
January and April 1952 destroyed 127 Communist aircraft while losing only 9 in aerial combat.
In spite of increasing vulnerability to flak damage, the Fifth Air Force continued its raids against railways. In January
1952 the FEAF Bomber Command's B-29s joined this interdiction campaign. Although the Communists managed
to build up supply dumps in forward areas, the UN air forces damaged the railways enough to prevent the enemy from
supporting a sustained major offensive. The interdiction missions also forced the North Koreans and Chinese to divert
materiel and troops from the front lines to protect and repair the railways.
As the ground began to thaw, between March 3 and 25, the Fifth Air Force bombed key railways, but with limited success. For example, on the 25th fighter-bombers attacked the railway between Chongju, on the west coast 60 miles northeast of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and Sinanju, 20 miles further to the southeast. This strike closed the railway line for only 5 days before the Communists repaired it. The B-29s were somewhat more successful during the last week in March, knocking out bridges at Pyongyang and Sinanju. Fifth Air Force continued the interdiction campaign through April while looking for more effective means to block North Korean transport systems.
In the winter of 1951-1952, with the establishment of static battle lines, the need for close air support declined drastically. To use the potential fire power of the fighter-bombers, in January 1952 the UN commander alternated aerial bombardment of enemy positions on 1 day with artillery attacks of the same positions on the next day. The Chinese and North Korean troops merely dug deeper trenches and tunnels that were generally invulnerable to either air or artillery strikes. After a month the UN Commander, General Ridgway, ordered the strikes stopped. With peace talks at Panmunjom stalemated and ground battle lines static, on April 30 UN air commanders prepared a new strategy of military pressure against the enemy by attacking targets previously exempted or underexploited. ... More
Description The new UN strategy sought to increase military pressure on North Korea and thus force the Communist negotiators to
temper their demands. In May 1952 the Fifth Air Force shifted from interdiction missThe new UN strategy sought to increase military pressure on North Korea and thus force the Communist negotiators to
temper their demands. In May 1952 the Fifth Air Force shifted from interdiction missions against transportation networks to attacks on North Korean supply depots and industrial targets. On May 8 UN fighter-bombers blasted a supply depot and a week later destroyed a vehicle repair factory at Tang-dong, a few miles north of Pyongyang. The Fifth Air Force, under a new Commander, Maj. Gen. Glen O. Barcus, also destroyed munitions factories and a steelfabricating plant during May and June. Meanwhile, Gen. Mark W. Clark took over the United Nations Command.
Beginning on June 23, U.S. Navy and Fifth Air Force units made coordinated attacks on the electric power complex at
Sui-ho Dam, on the Yalu River near Sinuiju, followed by strikes against the Chosin, Fusen, and Kyosen power plants,
all located midway between the Sea of Japan and the Manchurian border in northeastern Korea. The aerial reconnaissance function, always important in target selection, became indispensable to the strategy of increased aerial bombardment, since target planners sought the most lucrative targets. One inviting target was the capital city of Pyongyang. It remained unscathed until July 11, when aircraft of the Seventh Fleet, the 1st Marine Air Wing, the Fifth Air Force. the British Navy, and the Republic of Korea Air Force struck military targets there. That night, following day-long attacks, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command sent a flight of B-29s to bomb 8 targets. Post-strike assessments of Pyongyang showed considerable damage inflicted to command posts, supply dumps, factories, barracks, antiaircraft gun sites, and railroad facilities. The North Koreans subsequently upgraded their antiaircraft defenses, forcing UN fighter-bombers and light bombers (B-26s) to sacrifice accuracy and bomb from higher altitudes.
Allied air forces returned to Pyongyang again on August 29 and 30, destroying most of their assigned targets. In September the Fifth Air Force sent its aircraft against troop concentrations and barracks in northwest Korea while Bomber Command bombed similar targets near Hamhung in northeast Korea. Along the front lines, throughout the summer and fall of 1952, the FEAF joined the U.S. Navy and Marines to provide between 2,005 and 4,000 close air support sorties each month. For example, FEAF Bomber Command not only flew nighttime interdiction missions but also gave radar-directed close air support
(10,000 or more meters from friendly positions) at night to front-line troops under Communist attack.
During the daytime the Mustang (F-51) pilots flew preplanned and immediate close air support missions. The 315th Air Division also supported the ground forces, flying supplies and personnel into Korea and returning wounded, reassigned, and furloughed personnel to Japan. C-124s, more efficient on the long haul, carded personnel and cargo. C-47s provided tactical airlift to airfields near the front lines, and C-l 19s handled bulky cargo and airborne and airdrop operations.
During the summer of 1952, the 4th and 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wings replaced many of their F-86Es with moditied F-86Fs. The new Sabre aircraft had more powerful engines and improved leading wing edges which allowed them to match the aerial combat performance of the MiG-15 jet fighters of the North Korean and Chinese air forces. Even though the Communists had built up their air order of battle, they still tended to restrict their flights to MiG Alley and often avoided aerial combat with the F-86 pilots. By August and September, however, MiG pilots showed more initiative, and aerial engagements occurred almost daily. Even though the Communist pilots improved their tactics and proficiency, U.S. pilots destroyed many more MiGs,
achieving at the end of October a ratio of 8 enemy losses to every U.S. loss.
The Communists, in spite of the pressure of the air campaign, remained stubborn in the truce talks. On October 8, 1952, the UN negotiators at Panmunjom recessed the talks because the Chinese would not agree to nonforced* repatriation of prisoners of war. As winter set in, UN forces in Korea remained mired in the stalemated conflict. ... More
Criteria Criteria for award of the Republic of Korea Korean War Service Medal (ROK KWSM) have been established by the ROK government. To qualify for the medal, the veteran must have: Served between the outbrea... Criteria for award of the Republic of Korea Korean War Service Medal (ROK KWSM) have been established by the ROK government. To qualify for the medal, the veteran must have: Served between the outbreak of hostilities, June 25, 1950, and the date the armistice was signed, July 27, 1953, Been on permanent assignment or on temporary duty for 30 consecutive days or 60 non-consecutive days Performed his / her duty within the territorial limits of Korea, in the waters immediately adjacent thereto or in aerial flight over Korea participating in actual combat operations or in support of combat operations MoreHide
Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Best Moment
I was the 3rd ART tech to joint the new 434th TCG (Med)(Res)At Atterbury Air Force Base. I was Air force working at a soon to become AFRES Base.I was with 930th at the time.
Chain of Command
Maj. Robert E Jordan for the Commanding General 10th AF
Other Memories
We needed 800 men for the 2466th AFRTC.
Best Friends
Robert N Wright,John Polley, Dewey Abel,Glen Schneck,Herbert A. Williams and John H Lewis and many more.
Best Moment
WE were Trp Carr Sq. with the 74th ,73rd,80th,With the 448th Bomb Sq. We were a active Status ARes Units out of Stout Field.I never stopped Training there was always something new to learn in the AF.
Chain of Command
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS Constituted Headquarters, 434th Troop Carrier Group. WD Ltr. AG 320.2 (1-28-43) OB-I-AF-M, dated 30 January 1943. Activated At Alliance Army Air Field, Nebraska, on 9 February 1943. GO 3, HQ., Army Air Base, Alliance, Nebraska 1943, pursuant to above-cited WD Ltr. Dated 30 January 1943. Inactivated At Greenville Army Air Base, South Carolina, on 31 July 1946. GO 77, Hq., Third Air Force, 29 July 1946, pursuant to WD Ltr. AG 322 (9 Jul 46) AO-I-AFCOR (169(e))-M, dated 12 July 1946. Allotted to the Organized Reserves On 29 January 1947. WD Ltr. AG AO-I 322 (23 Jan 47) AFCOR (403(e))-M, dated 29 January 1947. Activated At Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana, on 15 March 1947. GO 8, Hq., Eleventh Air Force, 6 March 1947, pursuant to the above-cited WD Ltr., dated 29 January 1947. Redesignated Headquarters 434th Troop Carrier Group. Medium, effective 1 July 1949. GO 49, HQ., Tenth Air Force, 1 July 1949, pursuant to DAF Ltr. 322 (AFOOR 225f), 1 July 1949. Ordered to Active Military Duty Effective 1 May 1951, at Atterbury Air Force Base, Indiana. DAF Ltr. 322 (AFOMO 3g), 2 February 1951. Relieved from Active Duty Effective 1 February 1953. DAF Ltr. 322 (AFOMO 266h), 15 December 1952.
Other Memories
Moved from unit/Sq because of shortage of good pilots. I was checking out in about every large plane that I could. I then became a Instructor.
Chain of Command
From its home at Fenton, the 528th reached out to the Japanese installations in the Netherlands East Indies, striking at well fortified Japanese oil refining and dock facilities, and cutting the Japanese supply lines. On 23 April 1944, on a bombing run over Noemfoor Island, five aircraft of the 528th Participated in the wildest shooting spree of the war for the squadron. These five B-24s were intercepted by twenty-five Japanese fighters and a very hot battle ensued for the next hour. Twelve of the enemy fighters were shoot down, all five of the Liberators managed to make it back to Fenton, although heavily damaged. The squadron was not without losses though, one deadly and six wounded. This battle resulted in 21 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 10 Silver Stars being awarded to members of the 528th. Moved to the Philippines where the squadron operated in early 1945, then to Okinawa where combat operations ended after the Japanese Capitulation in August. After the war, squadron personnel were demobilized and returned to the United States, the B-24s sent to reclamation in the Philippines. Inactivated as a paper unit in early 1946. In 1947, the 528th Bombardment Squadron was reactivated as a reserve unit of the Strategic Air Command at MacDill Field, Florida. The squadron remained an inactive reserve unit until 1951 when the squadron was inactivated. Just some History
Other Memories
2ND AF,246TH AAF BU, AAF PRATT, KANSAS 528TH BOMB SQDN ( B-29 ) PAAE? 233RD AAFBU.CCT ( VERY HEAVY ) DAIS-MONTRAN FLD B-29 TUCSON.ARIZ 1943 TO 1944 FOUND IN MY FATHERS INFO list of all his units assigned to in his AF career.
Description (Western Pacific Campaign 15 June 1944 to 2 September 1945) Attacks on Truk, where the Japanese had a major base, continued as preparations were made for the invasion of the Marianas. The American tro(Western Pacific Campaign 15 June 1944 to 2 September 1945) Attacks on Truk, where the Japanese had a major base, continued as preparations were made for the invasion of the Marianas. The American troops that landed on Saipan on 15 June 1944 met bitter opposition; but, after a desperate Japanese counterattack on 7 July, organized resistance soon terminated. Tinian, invaded on 25 July, was won by I August. Guam, which had been seized by the Japanese on 10 December 1941, was invaded on 20 July and regained after 20 days of fighting. With the conquest of the Marianas, the United States gained valuable bases for an aerial offensive against Japan itself. To provide bases for operations against the Philipgines, the Palaus were invaded in mid-September. Later, aerial attacks were made on Formosa to support the invasion of the Philippines and Okinawa.... More
People You Remember
I was just 20 years old and I was of LeMay's Boys training to fly B-29.
Strike Swiftly 71st Special Operations SQ