Criteria The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service... The National Defense Service Medal is awarded for honorable active service as a member of the Armed Forces during the Korean War, Vietnam War, the war against Iraq in the Persian Gulf, and for service during the current War on Terrorism. In addition, all members of the National Guard and Reserve who were part of the Selected Reserve in good standing between August 2, 1990, to November 30, 1995, are eligible for the National Defense Service Medal. In the case of Navy personnel, Midshipment attending the Naval Academy during the qualifying periods are eligible for this award, and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Midshipmen ae only eligible if they participated in a summer cruise that was in an area which qualified for a campaign medal. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Description Just after midnight on January 17, 1991 in the U.S., Bush gave the order for U.S. troops to lead an international coalition in an attack on Saddam Hussein’s army. U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf led “Just after midnight on January 17, 1991 in the U.S., Bush gave the order for U.S. troops to lead an international coalition in an attack on Saddam Hussein’s army. U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf led “Operation Desert Storm,” which began with a massive bombing of Hussein’s armies in Iraq and Kuwait. The ensuing campaign, which is remembered in part for the United States’ use of superior military technology, introduced the term “smart bombs” to the global vernacular—precision-bombing devices aimed primarily at destroying infrastructure and minimizing civilian casualties. In response, Hussein launched SCUD missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iraq’s use of SCUDs, notoriously inaccurate weapons designed to terrorize civilian targets, nearly succeeded in inciting the Israelis to retaliate. Hussein hoped an Israeli military response would draw neighboring Arab nations into the fight on Iraq’s side, but he again committed a grave miscalculation. Bush reassured Israelis that the U.S. would protect them from Hussein’s terrifying SCUD attacks and Israel resisted the urge to retaliate. Soon after, U.S. –installed Patriot missiles destroyed SCUD missiles in flight and further foiled Hussein’s plan to goad Israel into a holy war.
Following an intense bombing of Baghdad, U.S.-led coalition ground forces marched into Kuwait and across the Iraq border. Regular Iraqi troops surrendered in droves, leaving only Hussein’s hard-line Republican Guard to defend the capital, which they were unsuccessful in doing. After pushing Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait, Schwarzkopf called a ceasefire on February 28; he accepted the surrender of Iraqi generals on March 3.... More
Memories
...supported operations for Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm, 1990-1991...
Criteria
The Air Force Overseas Long Tour Service Ribbon is issued for completion of a standard overseas service assignment of two years or more in length
On 17 December 1989 the national command authority (NCA) directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to execute PLAN 90-2. JTFSO received the JCS execute order on 18 Dec with a D-Day and H-Hour of 20 Dec
On 17 December 1989 the national command authority (NCA) directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to execute PLAN 90-2. JTFSO received the JCS execute order on 18 Dec with a D-Day and H-Hour of 20 Dec 0100 local. The operation was conducted as a campaign with limited military objectives. JTFSO objectives in PLAN 90-2 were to:
A. Protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities.
B. Capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority.
C. Neutralize PDF forces.
D. Neutralize PDF command and control.
E. Support establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama.
F. Restructure the PDF.
At Forts Bragg, Benning, and Stewart, D-Day forces were alerted, marshaled, and launched on a fleet of 148 aircraft. Units from the 75th Ranger Regiment and 82d Airborne Division conducted airborne assaults to strike key objectives at Rio Hato, and Torrijos/Tocumen airports.
On December 20, 1989, the 82d Airborne Division conducted their first combat jump since World War II onto Torrijos International Airport, Panama. The 1st Brigade task force made up of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, parachuted into combat for the first time since World War II. In Panama, the paratroopers were joined on the ground by 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment which was already in Panama. After the night combat jump and seizure of the airport, the 82nd conducted follow-on combat air assault missions in Panama City and the surrounding areas.
They were followed later by the 2d and 1st Bdes, 7th Inf Div (L), while the in-place forces comprised of the 3d Bde (-), 7th Inf Div (L); 193d Infantry Brigade (L) and 4-6 Inf, 5th Inf Div (M), assaulted objectives in both Panama City and on the Atlantic side of the Canal. By the first day, all D-Day objectives were secured. As initial forces moved to new objectives, follow-on forces from 7th Inf Div (L) moved into the western areas of Panama and into Panama City.
As the lead headquarters for SAC's tanker support, the Eighth Air Force tasked, executed, and directed 144 missions to refuel 229 receivers with over 12 million pounds of fuel. According to General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Eighth’s "air refuelers did not just make a difference in this operation -- they made it possible." This mission introduced the F-117A Stealth Fighter to combat for the first time.
Air National Guard units participated in the operation because of their regularly scheduled presence in Panama for Operations CORONET COVE and VOLANT OAK. Only Pennsylvania's 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) was part of the integral planning process by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Staff for the invasion of Panama. The 105th Military Airlift Group (MAG) and the 172 MAG provided airlift support for the operation. They flew 35 missions, completed 138 sorties, moved 1,911 passengers and 1,404.7 tons of cargo which expended 434.6 flying hours. ANG VOLANT OAK C-130 aircrews flew 22 missions, completed 181 sorties, moved 3,107 passengers and 551.3 tons of cargo, which expended 140.1 flying hours. The ANG CORONET COVE units, the 114th TFG and the 18Oth TFG flew 34 missions, completed 34 sorties, expended 71.7 flying hours and expended 2,715 rounds of ordnance.
Urban terrain provides high potential for fratricide because of the likelihood of close quarters (high weapons density), recognition problems, and unfamiliar secondary effects of weapons. During Operation JUST CAUSE soldiers employed several ineffective and dangerous techniques to breach various fences, walls, and barred doors with grenades, rifle fire, and even anti-tank weapons. Direct fire support, even from just a block away, is very difficult to control. During JUST CAUSE mechanized forces providing fire support were told by brigade a light force had cleared a tall hotel building only to the second floor. In actual fact, it had cleared to the tenth floor and was fighting in a counter-sniper engagement. Seeing this fire and apparently some weapons protruding, the mechanized forces began to suppress. This drew return fire from the friendly light force for some seconds before coming under control. The extensive destruction of civilian housing seen by TV viewers around the world resulted rather from a style of fighting that is based on abundant firepower.
The high casualties and use of resources usually associated with all-out urban warfare did not occur. The United States suffered 23 KIA and 324 WIA, with estimated enemy casualties around 450. There were an estimated 200 to 300 Panamanian civilian fatalities. Some were killed by the PDF, others inadvertently by US troops. More civilians almost certainly would have been killed or wounded had it not been for the discipline of the American forces and their stringent rules of engagement (ROE). However, the United Nations (UN) put the civilian death toll at 500; the Central American Human Rights Defense Commission (CODEHUCA) and the Peace and Justice Service of Panama both claimed between 2,000 to 3000; the Panamanian National Human Rights Commission and an independent inquiry by former Attorney- General Ramsey Clark claimed over 4,000. Thousands were injured. As it turned out, the figure of Panamanian dead was large enough to stimulate debate over the need for the invasion to remove Noriega, but not large enough to generate a sense of outrage in Panama or abroad, or to turn the Panamanian people against the US intervention or the nation-building program that followed it.
The US troops involved in Operation Just Cause achieved their primary objectives quickly, and troop withdrawal began on December 27. Noreiga eventually surrendered to US authorities voluntarily. He is now serving a 40-year sentence in Florida for drug trafficking.
Operation JUST CAUSE was unique in the history of U.S. warfare for many reasons. As the largest single contingency operation since World War II, it focused on a combination of rapid deployment of critical combat power and precise utilization of forward deployed and in-country forces. Impressed by the smooth execution of JUST CAUSE, General Stiner later claimed that the operation was relatively error free, confining the Air-and Battle doctrine and validating the strategic direction of the military. He concluded, therefore, that while old lessons were confirmed, there were "no [new] lessons learned" during the campaign. Despite Stiner's assertions, Operation JUST CAUSE offers important insights into the role of force in the post Cold War period and the successful conduct of a peacetime contingency operation.
... More
Memories
...support in operations with Operation Just Cause...
Description Operation Golden Pheasant was an emergency deployment of U.S. troops to Honduras in 1988, in response to Nicaraguan attacks on Contra logistics in Honduras.
In early March, 1988, the Nicaraguan SandiOperation Golden Pheasant was an emergency deployment of U.S. troops to Honduras in 1988, in response to Nicaraguan attacks on Contra logistics in Honduras.
In early March, 1988, the Nicaraguan Sandinista government launched Operation Danto to overrun Contra rebel supply caches in the San Andrés de Bocay region, crossing into Honduran territory in their drive.
The United States, under President Ronald Reagan, dispatched elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) on a no-notice deployment. This small force quickly landed at Palmerola Air Base (now known as Soto Cano Air Base) and moved quickly into position at a Honduran military base to facilitate the guarding of a local general. An international special operations unit led by Orlando Lentini worked along with the 7th Infantry Division and were on the ground several days when the 82nd Airborne elements arrived. The deployment evolved into a live-fire exercise, the light infantry soldiers, paratroopers and special operations unit deployed ready to fight, causing the Sandinistas to rapidly withdraw back across their border.
The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 82nd Airborne Division, were joined by soldiers from the 2nd Battalion 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 27th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light) QRF from Fort Ord, California.
On 17 March, 1st Battalion landed at Palmerola Airfield, a Honduran Air Force base that was the headquarters for the U.S. military presence in Honduras. The 2nd Battalion jumped onto the airfield that day, soldiers of the 27th Infantry Regiment (the "Wolfhounds") rappelled onto the airbase on 17 March 1988 and moved quickly up to the Nicaraguan border.
The units from the 82nd Airborne, the 504th began rigorous training exercises with orders to avoid the fighting on the border. Had those orders changed, the paratroopers and infantrymen were prepared to fight, but the invading Sandinista troops had already begun to withdraw. Within days, the Sandinista government negotiated a truce with Contra leaders, and by the end of March the 7th Infantry had returned to Fort Ord, California and the paratroopers of the 504th had returned to Fort Bragg.... More
Memories
...support operations in Nicaragus region...
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Description
The United States bombing of Libya (code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon) comprised the joint United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps air-strikes against Libya on April 15, 1986.
Memories
...support of operations for action with Libya & Gulf of Sidra...
Criteria The Air Force Commendation Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States below the grade of Brigadier General who, while serving in any capacity with the Air Force, distingu... The Air Force Commendation Medal may be awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States below the grade of Brigadier General who, while serving in any capacity with the Air Force, distinguish themselves by heroism, outstanding achievement, or by meritorious service not of a sufficient nature to justify a higher award. MoreHide
Criteria The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospital... The Outstanding Unit Award may be awarded by the Secretary of the Air Force to numbered units such as Air Forces, Air Divisions, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons and to Medical Facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and medical centers (whether or not they are numbered) for exceptionally meritorious service or exceptionally outstanding achievement that clearly sets the unit above and apart from similar units. Heroism may be involved, but is not essential. MoreHide
Criteria It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Long... It is awarded to all service members of the U.S. Air Force who complete four years of honorable active or reserve military service with any branch of the United States Armed Forces. The Air Force Longevity Service Award is a ribbon that replaces the Federal Service Stripes previously worn on the uniform. MoreHide
Description The Invasion of Grenada was a 1983 United States–led invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, with a population of about 91,000 located 160 kilometres (99 mi) north of Venezuela, that resulThe Invasion of Grenada was a 1983 United States–led invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, with a population of about 91,000 located 160 kilometres (99 mi) north of Venezuela, that resulted in a U.S. victory within a matter of weeks. Codenamed Operation Urgent Fury, it was triggered by a hard-line Stalinist coup that resulted in the execution of the previous left-wing revolutionary leader. The invasion resulted in the appointment of an interim government, followed by democratic elections in 1984. The country has remained a democratic nation since then.
Grenada gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1974. The leftist New Jewel Movement seized power in a coup in 1979 under Maurice Bishop, suspending the constitution and detaining a number of political prisoners. In 1983, an internal power struggle began over Bishop's relatively moderate foreign policy approach, and on October 19, hard-line Stalinists captured and executed Bishop, his partner Jacqueline Creft, along with three cabinet ministers and two union leaders. Subsequently, following appeals by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Governor-General of Grenada, Paul Scoon, the Reagan Administration in the U.S. quickly decided to launch a military intervention. From the U.S. perspective, the decision to intervene was in part motivated by concerns over the 600 U.S. medical students on the island and fearing a repeat of the Iran hostage crisis.
The U.S. invasion began six days after Bishop's death, on the morning of 25 October 1983. The U.S. Army's Rapid Deployment Force (1st, 2nd Ranger Battalions and 82nd Airborne Division Paratroopers), U.S. Marines, U.S. Army Delta Force, and U.S. Navy SEALs and other combined forces constituted the 7,600 troops from the United States, Jamaica, and members of the Regional Security System (RSS)[6] defeated Grenadian resistance after a low-altitude airborne assault by the 75th Rangers on Point Salines Airport on the southern end of the island, and a Marine helicopter and amphibious landing occurred on the northern end at Pearl's Airfield shortly afterward. The military government of Hudson Austin was deposed and replaced by a government appointed by Governor-General Paul Scoon until elections were held in 1984.... More
Memories
...support operations for Operation Urgent Fury...
Criteria
The Air Force Overseas Long Tour Service Ribbon is issued for completion of a standard overseas service assignment of two years or more in length
Description When Iranian "students" seized the US embassy on 04 November 1979, the USS CORAL SEA (CV 43) spent most of its deployment on "Gonzo Station" off the southern coast of Iran before returning home in JunWhen Iranian "students" seized the US embassy on 04 November 1979, the USS CORAL SEA (CV 43) spent most of its deployment on "Gonzo Station" off the southern coast of Iran before returning home in June of 1980. Meanwhile, the Air Force scrambled to regenerate its special operations capabilities. By December 1979, a rescue force was selected and a training program was under way. Training exercises were conducted through March 1980 and the JCS approved mission execution on 16 April 1980. Between 19 and 23 April, the forces deployed to Southwest Asia.
On 24 April 1980, after six months of failed negotiation, the national command authorities executed Operation Eagle Claw to free US hostages held in Iran by militant students.
On the evening of 24 April, six C-130s left Masirah Island, Oman, and eight RH-53D helicopters departed the USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea. Both formations headed for the location code-named Desert One. Within four hours, two helicopters had aborted. The remaining helicopters were delayed due to an unforecast "dust front," and one developed a hydraulic leak that its crew could not fix at the Desert One site. Because planners had decided six helicopters were required for the mission to continue, and only five were now available, the rescue attempt was aborted.
The plan called for eight Navy RH-53D helicopters to fly 600 miles to Desert One and, under the cover of darkness, refuel from KC-130 tankers, load a 120-man Army assault team and proceed to two additional hide sites. One of the go/no-go parameters for the mission was a minimum of six operational helicopters. Within four hours, two helicopters aborted due to mechanical failure. The remaining aircraft were delayed due to weather, with one of them not operational due to a hydraulic leak.
While repositioning to refuel from the C-130s, one helicopter collided with a C-130. The two aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames. The on-scene commander decided at that point to load the survivors of the collision and all the other helicopter crews in the C-130s and depart. Eight men had been killed and five more injured. Five intact helicopters, the burned wreckage of the helicopter and C-130, and the dead, were left behind.
It was during the evacuation of the site that problems arose. One of the helicopters collided with a KC-130 during refueling. The result was 193 million dollars worth of equipment and eight dead servicemen left behind. Unlike Operation Ivory Coast, analysis of the mission concluded that there were significant problems. Command and control during the execution of the operation was flawed. Violating the principle of unity of command, there was no designated mission commander for six months, hampering the training, planning, and execution of the operation. There were separate commanders for site security, helicopter force, ground force, KC-130, and landing support. The ground force commander had go/no-go authority, but he was not known to the rest of the force. Training was also not conducted in a joint manner. It was conducted at the individual and unit level within each component. Although there were few rehearsals that assessed specific portions of the operation, there was no full dress rehearsal. Compounding the problem was communications inter- operability and procedural restraints.
A six-member commission was appointed by the JCS to study the operation. Headed by Adm James L. Holloway III, the panel included Gen LeRoy Manor, who commanded the earlier Son Tay raid. One issue investigated was selection of aircrew. Navy and Marine pilots with little experience in long-range overland navigation or refueling from C-130s were selected though more than a hundred qualified Air Force H-53 pilots were available. Another issue was the lack of a comprehensive readiness evaluation and mission rehearsal program. From the beginning, training was not conducted in a truly joint manner; it was compartmented and held at scattered locations throughout the US. The limited rehearsals that were conducted assessed only portions of the total mission. Also at issue was the number of helicopters used. The commission concluded that at least ten and perhaps as many as twelve helicopters should have been launched to guarantee the minimum of six required for completion of the mission. The plan was also criticized for using the "hopscotch" method of ground refueling instead of air refueling as was used for the Son Tay raid. By air refueling en route, the commission thought the entire Desert One scenario could have been avoided.... More
Memories
...support of operations with Operation Desert One...Iran...
Criteria The Air Force Training Ribbon is awarded to Air Force members on completing an Air Force accession training program (i.e., Basic Military Training; Officer Training School; ROTC; Air Force Academy; or... The Air Force Training Ribbon is awarded to Air Force members on completing an Air Force accession training program (i.e., Basic Military Training; Officer Training School; ROTC; Air Force Academy; or Medical Services, Judge Advocate, or Chaplain orientation courses). MoreHide
When I offically became a Firefighter!
SSGT. Locklear
Attended USAF Firefighter Taninee School