Last Known Activity:
Casualty Occurrence: This Airman was presumed dead after he was lost or crash over land.
This Veteran has an (IMO) In Memory Of Headstone in Courts of the Missing at the Honolulu Memorial, Hawaii.
The MISTY Forward Air Controllers were "fast mover" FACS flying two-seater F-100F SuperSabres and (later) F-4 Phantoms. On 16 August 1968 Majors Michael O. McElhannon and John F. Overlock, both assigned to the 309th Tac Ftr Sqdn but on temporary duty with the 37th Tac Ftr Wing at Phu Cat, were conducting a MISTY mission over the area of North Vietnam just north of the DMZ in an F-100F (tail number 56-3865) belonging to the 612th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Phu Cat. The aircraft had completed an in-flight refueling earlier in the mission. The last contact with the MISTY FAC occurred when Major McElhannon advised controllers he was leaving station to go feet wet for another hit on the tanker.
The MISTY flight wasn't missed for about 45 minutes, when an incoming flight attempted to contact it for FAC control. Search and rescue operations failed to locate either aircraft wreckage or crew. It was presumed that the aircraft went down somewhere in the area of Dong Hoi or over water.
Both crewmen were carried as Missing in Action until the Secretary of the Air Force approved Presumptive Findings of death for Overlock (09 Oct 75) and McElhannon (06 Feb 79). During this time McElhannon was promoted to Colonel and Overlock to Lieutenant Colonel.
The Library of Congress has begun digitizing their Vietnam MIA records, making available information previously accessible only to those within striking range of Washington, DC. Several of those records refer to preliminary surveys of a crash site some 13 kilometers north-northwest of Dong Hoi but also cite evidence indicating the aircraft may have crashed offshore. In any case, the remains of the two men have not been recovered.
U.S. Air Force Major John Francis Overlock of Springfield, Massachusetts, was assigned to the 309th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at Tuy Hoa Airbase, South Vietnam . His temporary duty assignment was with the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Phu Cat Airbase, South Vietnam
On August 16, 1968 , Major Overlock departed Phu Cat at 0608 on a single-plane, forward air controller (FAC) mission over North Vietnam . The intended target was RP-1. He was the front seat pilot in a camouflaged, North American F-100F Super Sabre--tail number 56-3865. Occupying the back seat position was Major Michael D. McElhanon of Bonham , Texas . Although McElhanon was the senior officer and a pilot, he performed as the co-pilot on this mission.
The F-100 was the first fighter to fly faster than sound. Nicknamed the 'Hun' after its numerical designation, the first production model flew on October 29, 1953 . From 1957, the Hun equipped sixteen USAF wings, and in Vietnam various models flew with such intensity that by 1969, just four wings (the 3rd TFW, 31st TFW, 35th TFW and 37th TFW) had exceeded the number of missions flown by the 15,000-plus Mustangs in World War II.
The 'F' model, the sixth and final model of the F-100, changed the single-seat aircraft into a two-seater. The fuselage was extended to accommodate tandem dual-control cockpits with a one-piece clamshell canopy. Lost in the design was some fuel capacity and two of the four M-39 20mm guns in the nose.
All tactical strike aircraft operating in Southeast Asia had to be under the control of a FAC, who was familiar with the locale and the tactical situation. It was the FAC who would find the target, order up fighter/bomber aircraft from a command and control station based in the air or on the ground, mark the target, and then remain on station throughout the operation and make a bomb damage assessment upon its completion. FAC missions were flown in several aircraft types, including slower Cessna models. When FAC missions were flown in faster aircraft, such as the F-100, they were called the "Misty" FAC. On this mission, Major Overlock's call sign was Misty 11 and the airborne command and control station was called Cricket Control.
There were scattered clouds in the area at 2,000 feet and broken clouds to 9,000 feet; visibility was unrestricted. At 0845, Misty 11 reported its position to Cricket Control as 106 degrees 50 minutes east, 17 degrees 31 minutes north. At 0858 they reported to Cricket Control that they were leaving the area to rendezvous with a tanker over the Gulf of Tonkin, but they did not give their position nor indicate they were experiencing any difficulty. This was their last radio transmission, as their next scheduled report at 0925 was not received.
At 0950, another FAC arrived in the area and attempted to contact Misty 11 for possible target information. When contact could not be established, the FAC initiated a check with other airfields to determine if Misty 11 had diverted, but received negative replies. He then contacted the refueling tanker and learned that the aircraft had not arrived to refuel. Misty 11 was presumed to be down in the area along a line from the point of last contact east to the tanker. At approximately 1035, the FAC and other search aircraft initiated a visual and electronic search over the intended flight path and continued to search until dusk with negative results. The search area was varied, consisting of rugged, forested mountains, a highly populated flat coastal plain containing small villages, and a portion of the Gulf of Tonkin . The search was resumed at dawn, but was formally terminated on the evening of August 17 due to negative results.
The 37th TFW was informed at 1045 on August 16 that Misty 11 was presumed down and the status of the pilots was unknown. The 37th Combat Support Group (CSG) at Phu Cat Air Base initiated a Casualty Report (Initial, Missing in Action, Battle ), which stated that a visual and electronic search was initiated at 1105 and was continuing. The report also indicated that the parents??Theresa M. Overlock, Francis J. Overlock, Dorothy T. McElhanon and Samuel O. McElhanon??and the wives??Theresa M. Overlock and Naomi Frances McElhanon??would be notified by Headquarters Staff, USAF. On August 17 the 37th CSG initiated a Casualty Report (Supplemental, Missing in Action, Battle), which stated that a change in the missing status was determined to be unwarranted based on the fact that the area was extremely hostile, and parts of it were heavily forested, hampering an air search. It was considered possible that the pilots had landed safely and were captured or were evading.
On September 23, 1968, the 37th CSG sent a message to the Air Force Military Personnel Center (USAFMPC) at Randolph AFB, Texas , indicating that the position of Misty 11 had been established at 325 degrees, 58 nautical miles from Dong Ha TACAN at 0845. This position would have placed them at 17 degrees 39 minutes north, 106 degrees 2 minutes east. On September 25, USAFMPC sent a message to the 37th CSG requesting that they confirm the figures provided in their message of the previous day, and provide an estimated position of Misty 11 at 0858. On September 27, the 37th CSG replied, confirming the coordinates and stating the Unit Commander's assertion that during the period from 0845 to 0858, Misty 11 was probably continuing to search for targets while flying at a level below which radar could observe him. The Unit Commander stated that Misty 11's radio contact at 0858, indicating he was going out to refuel, would normally have been made at about the time he approached the coastline heading for the tanker. However, there was no way to confirm that he was over land or water at the time of the last radio contact. The best estimate of Misty 11's position at the time of last radio contact was somewhere between his position at 0845 and the coast.
A year later, in August 1969, an investigation and review of the case of the officers missing since August 16, 1968 was completed. Pursuant to Section 555, Title 37, USC, an official determination was made to continue the MIA status of Lieutenant Colonels McElhanon and Overlock??both men were promoted on August 17, 1969 , a year and a day since they went missing. Official reports announcing the continuation of MIA status were issued and next of kin were notified.
Six years later, on September 16, 1975 , Colonel A.W. Gratch of the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas , conducted a status review hearing in the case of Lieutenant Colonel John Francis Overlock. The review hearing, conducted pursuant to Chapter 10, Title 37, USC, and Air Force Regulation 35-43, convened at 0900. Mrs. Beverly J. Overlock requested to appear at the hearing without counsel and was present. Mr. and Mrs. Francis J. Overlock were notified of the hearing but chose not to appear. Major Ed Silverbush, Chief, Missing Persons, briefed Mrs. Overlock on the facts and circumstances of the incident, after the case file, including previously classified information, was made available to her. He told her that no accounting for either officer was ever received from the North Vietnamese government or their allies, and their names never appeared in the prisoner communication channels, which have proven reliable. In addition, no information pertaining to them has ever been obtained from any official or unofficial source. Mrs. Overlock raised no objections nor offered anything further concerning the issue of whether Colonel Overlock may be reasonably presumed to be alive. Upon completion of the hearing, Colonel Hatch advised Mrs. Overlock he would recommend her husband be terminated by a finding of death under Title 37, Section 555, USC.
The following day, Colonel Gratch submitted his recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. He referenced a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated August 17, 1973, regarding "Changes Of Status Of Servicemen Who Did Not Return From Southeast Asia." This memorandum requested that the Service Secretaries make each proposed status change a matter for their personal attention, and it was the desire of the Secretary of the Air Force to personally review each case. Colonel Gratch referenced the status review hearing of the previous day, and attached a memorandum that proposed a change of status from ?missing in action? to ?killed in action? for Lieutenant Colonel Overlock.
On October 9, 1975, Colonel Gratch received a letter from Major General Walter D. Druen Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel. The letter stated,:
Pursuant to authority delegated to me by the Secretary of the Air Force under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code, and following a full review of the case, I find that Lieutenant John F. Overlock, 125-28-2195FR, can no longer reasonably be presumed to be living. His missing in action status is therefore terminated by a finding of death pursuant to the authority contained in Section 555, Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code, and an official casualty report will be issued to include a statement that this finding was made following a subsequent review of all available information and, as provided by and for the purposes of the cited law, the date death is presumed to have occurred is the date I have signed this action. Death is held to have occurred while in a pay, flying pay, and duty status.
Major General Druen then sent letters to Mrs. Beverly J. Overlock and to Mr. and Mrs. Francis J. Overlock.The letters announced the official change of status, and explained that October 9, 1975 was not considered to be the actual or probable date of death, but is established in accordance with the cited law for the purpose of terminating pay and settling accounts. Beverly Overlock's letter encouraged her contact base assistance personnel for assistance in obtaining allowable benefits. It also offered the assistance of the Mortuary Branch at USAF Headquarters in Washington , DC, in arranging a Memorial Service. Francis and Theresa Overlock's letter was slightly longer and contained a summary of facts that Beverly Overlock had received at the status review hearing the previous month. The only new information presented in these letters was related to the position of Misty 11 at 0845 on August 16, 1968 . It stated that the position of 325 degrees, 58 nautical miles from Dong Ha, South Vietnam would have placed them at about ten nautical miles northwest of Dong Hoi, North Vietnam . Both letters were very thoughtful and sincere in their extension of condolences. They iterated that the Air Force was continuing its efforts to secure the necessary fact "which may lead to the recovery and identification of the remains of all our personnel lost in Southeast Asia ." The Overlocks were assured that they would be notified immediately if any information was received about the remains of John F. Overlock.
Another thirteen years had passed before hope was raised of finding Colonel Overlock or his remains, and a report of the search made its way to the Whitehouse National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency.From January 18-20, 1989, a joint United States-Vietnam investigation team investigated incidents involving the loss of American aircraft in Nhan Trach Village, Bo Trach District, Binh Tri Thien Province. The American team leaders were: James M. Coyle, Team Leader; MSGT Richard L. John, JCRC Analyst; and MSG Richard B. Huston, Search and Recovery Specialist. Vietnamese team members were: Lai Xuan Chieu, Team Leader; Luu Van Tho, and Nguyen Hong Dung. Major Ha Hien Luong of the Binh Tri Thien Province Military Command accompanied the team.
On January 20, 1989, the team returned to Ly Nhon Bac (pronounced LYS NHOWN BAWCS) Hamlet, on the northern band of the Song Dinh River, to investigate the reported crash of an American aircraft. Ly Nhon Bac is the part of Nhan Trach in which burial sites had been reported. There the team once again met Ngo Xe (pronounced NGOO XEE), former leader of the Nhan Trach Village Militia, who had previously provided the team with information on burial sites not related to RefNo 1250. Xe led the team to an open sandy area lying on the northern edge of the hamlet, saying that an A-6A aircraft had crashed there at about 0300 hours on August 16, 1968. The team conducted a survey that yielded results as follows:
The reported crash site is located at XE676418, in an open area of sand which slopes slightly to the east, at the northern edge of Ly Nhon Bac Hamlet. The soil shows evidence of recent disturbance (it is both darker in color than the surrounding sand, and its surface is rougher. A number of small pieces of plastic, rubber, and fabric lie scattered about the area. Use of the metal detector produced numerous readings indicating the presence of a substantial amount of sub-surface metal. The team took photographs of the site and fixed its location by compass readings.
At a private home in Ly Nhon Bac Hamlet, local residents displayed for the team two small pieces of wreckage which they claimed to have removed from the crash site as souvenirs. The team examined the pieces, photographed them, and recorded identification numbers from them as follows:
359901AE (with the A circled)
99193A (with the A circled)
0001 and 71613
Then, in order to escape the large and unruly crowd which had been hindering the survey, the team led Xe away to interview him in a more private location.
Xe told the team that at 0300 on August 16, 1968, he had been taking his shift in his fighting position when an American aircraft, either an A-6A or an A-37, came streaking over the village toward the sea at a very low level (Xe estimated 300 - 500 meters altitude). The aircraft was struck by 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire, burst into flames, and crashed into the dunes almost immediately. There were no other aircraft in the area at the time. At about 0500 Xe went out to examine the crash site. The aircraft wreckage was deeply embedded in the sand, with only its tail visible. Xe saw the numbers "A-37" on the tail of the aircraft, which is why he believed it to be an A-37. When asked to describe the aircraft, Xe could only say that it was "BIG" (the word accompanied by a sudden and dramatic spread of the arms, and that it had a delta wing configuration. He did not see it clearly in the air because everything happened so quickly. At the crash site Xe saw no trace of the pilot, and as the aircraft was no longer burning and appeared to pose to threat to the village, he went back to his bunker. Since that time he has neither seen nor heard of anyone discovering remains at or removing them from that site. Xe knew of no additional incidents, other than those previously reported that were not related to RefNo 1250.
On the way back to Dong Hoi, Major Luong told James Coyle that while the team had been conducting their survey of the crash site, he had heard from local residents that a number of them had recently uncovered the wreckage of the crashed aircraft, intending to sell it to a scrap dealer in Hue . When the Bo Trach District authorities learned of this arrangement, however, they ordered those people to fill in the pit they had dug. The locals invested a substantial amount of money in this abortive excavation, and they were concerned that the U.S. now wanted to take the wreckage away. Luong added that before the pit was filled in, some local children found a piece of silk in the wreckage. On the silk was some writing and a picture of the American flag. Unfortunately, the silk was torn apart when the children quarreled over the possession of it.
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