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Description USAF offtcials recognized the need for more F-86s to counter the Chinese Air Force in Korea. The 51st Fighter-Interceptor
Wing at Suwon Airfield, 15 miles south of Seoul, consequently received F-86s from the United States to replace its F-80s. On December 1, 1951, the wing flew its first combat missions in the new Sabrejets. Members of the 51st and 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wings shattered the Communists' air offensive, downing 26 MiGs in 2 weeks, while losing only 6 F-
86s. The Sabrejets achieved in the air the results that eluded the B-29s that bombed the enemy airfields near Pyongyang.
For the rest of the winter, the MiG pilots generally avoided aerial combat; nevertheless, Fifth Air Force pilots between
January and April 1952 destroyed 127 Communist aircraft while losing only 9 in aerial combat.
In spite of increasing vulnerability to flak damage, the Fifth Air Force continued its raids against railways. In January
1952 the FEAF Bomber Command's B-29s joined this interdiction campaign. Although the Communists managed
to build up supply dumps in forward areas, the UN air forces damaged the railways enough to prevent the enemy from
supporting a sustained major offensive. The interdiction missions also forced the North Koreans and Chinese to divert
materiel and troops from the front lines to protect and repair the railways.
As the ground began to thaw, between March 3 and 25, the Fifth Air Force bombed key railways, but with limited success. For example, on the 25th fighter-bombers attacked the railway between Chongju, on the west coast 60 miles northeast of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and Sinanju, 20 miles further to the southeast. This strike closed the railway line for only 5 days before the Communists repaired it. The B-29s were somewhat more successful during the last week in March, knocking out bridges at Pyongyang and Sinanju. Fifth Air Force continued the interdiction campaign through April while looking for more effective means to block North Korean transport systems.
In the winter of 1951-1952, with the establishment of static battle lines, the need for close air support declined drastically. To use the potential fire power of the fighter-bombers, in January 1952 the UN commander alternated aerial bombardment of enemy positions on 1 day with artillery attacks of the same positions on the next day. The Chinese and North Korean troops merely dug deeper trenches and tunnels that were generally invulnerable to either air or artillery strikes. After a month the UN Commander, General Ridgway, ordered the strikes stopped. With peace talks at Panmunjom stalemated and ground battle lines static, on April 30 UN air commanders prepared a new strategy of military pressure against the enemy by attacking targets previously exempted or underexploited.
