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Capt Michael Brennan (Mike)
to remember
Brennan, Herbert, Col.
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On 26 November 1967, Colonel Herbert O. Brennan, pilot and 1st Lt. Douglas C. Condit, co-pilot, comprised the crew of an F4C, call sign Pinhead 1, that departed DaNang Airfield as the lead aircraft in a flight of two. Their morning strike mission was against enemy truck traffic moving toward the Ban Karai Pass on its way to the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Pinhead flight's briefed flight path was from DaNang Airfield northwest paralleling the coastline, then ingressing into North Vietnam 30 miles northwest of Channel 109 to proceed to the target area. Their return was to be by the reverse route.
During the heat of battle, Pinhead 2 did not see any hostile ground fire directed at the lead aircraft, and while they did not see any parachutes, they did hear two emergency beepers coming from an area very near the crash site. At 0942 hours, moments after the lead aircraft was downed, search and rescue (SAR) efforts were initiated. Each time search aircraft passed over the crash site, they received enemy ground fire. The pilot of an A1E Sandy reported light to moderate small arms fire in the target area along with .50 caliber heavy weapons fire. All SAR operations were suspended one hour after both beepers ceased transmitting. At that time Herbert Brennan and Douglas Condit were both listed Missing in Action.
Brennan was a full Colonel who had a distinguished Air Force career spanning 20 years. Even though he was not required to serve in Vietnam, he willingly volunteered for a tour of duty there. His prior assignment was as an instructor at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
His status was changed from MIA to Died While Missing Oct 18, 1974.
The location of his remains is unknown.
Other Comments:
He attended West Point, graduating in 1947. (class of Alexander Haig and others.).
Some notes:
Newspaper account of 1954, states he was a veteran of the Korean War. On this occasion, he piloted a C-54 with one engine feathered, the other in trouble, bringing the aircraft safely down on a hillside, thus avoiding crashing in Pittsburg. (Stars and Stripes, 3 Feb 1954).
In 1956, he was a major at Bentwaters, England
Korean War/Third Korean Winter (1952-53)
From Month/Year
December / 1952
To Month/Year
April / 1953
Description The military stalemate continued throughout the winter of 1952-1953. Allied Sabrejet pilots, meantime, persisted in destroying MiGs at a decidedly favorable ratio. In December the Communists developed an ambush tactic against F-86 pilots patroling along the Yalu River: MiG pilots would catch the UN aircraft as they ran short of fuel and headed south to return to base. During these engagements, some of the F-84 pilots exhausted their fuel and had IO bail out over Cho-do Island, 60 miles southwest of Pyongyang.
United Nations forces held the island and maintained an air rescue detachment there for such emergencies. To avoid combat while low on fuel, Sabre pilots began to fly home over the Yellow Sea. MiG pilots at this time generally sought the advantages of altitude, speed, position, and numbers before engaging in aerial combat. The UN pilots, on the other hand, relied on their skills to achieve aerial victories, even though they were outnumbered and flying aircraft that did not quite match the flight capabilities of the MiG-15s.
One memorable battle occurred on February l8, 1953, near the Sui-ho Reservoir on the Yalu River, 110 miles north of Pyongyang; 4 F-86Fs attacked 48 MiGs, shot down 2, and caused 2 others to crash while taking evasive action. All 4 U.S. aircraft returned safely to their base. While the Fifth Air Force maintained air superiority over North Korea during daylight hours, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command on nighttime missions ran afoul of increasingly effective Communist interceptors. The aging B- 29s relied on darkness and electronic jamming for protection from both interceptors and antiaircraft gunfire, but the Communists used spotter aircraft and searchlights to reveal bombers to enemy gun crews and fighter-interceptor pilots.
As B-29 losses mounted in late 1952, the Bomber Command compressed bomber formations to shorten the time over targets and increase the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures. The Fifth Air Force joined the Navy and Marines to provide fighter escorts to intercept enemy aircraft before they could attack the B-29s. Bomber Command also restricted.missions along the Yalu to cloudy, dark nights because on clear nights contrails gave away the bombers' positions. FEAF lost no more B-29s after January 1953, although it continued its missions against industrial targets. On March 5 the B-29s penetrated deep into enemy territory to bomb a target at Chongjin in northeastern Korea, only 63 miles from the Soviet border. While Bomber Command struck industrial targets throughout North Korea during the winter of 1952-1953, the Fifth Air Force cooperated with the U.S. Navy's airmen in attacks on supplies, equipment, and troops near the from fines.
In December 1952 the Eighth Army moved its bombline from 10,000 to 3,000 meters from the front lines, enabling Fifth Air Force and naval fighter-bombers to target areas closer to American positions. Beyond the front lines, the Fifth Air Force focused on destroying railroads and bridges, allowing B-26s to bomb stalled vehicles. In January 1953 the Fifth Air Force attempted to cut the 5 railroad bridges over the Chongchon Estoary near Sinanju, 40 miles north of Pyongyang. Expecting trains to back up in marshaling yards at Sinanju, Bomber Command sent B-29s at night to bomb them, but these operations hindered enemy transportation only briefly.
As the ground thawed in the spring, however, the Communist forces had greater difficulty moving supplies and reinforcements in the face of the Fifth Air Force's relentless attacks on transportation. At the end of March 1953, the Chinese Communist government indicated its willingness to exchange injured and ill prisoners of war and discuss terms for a cease-fire in Korea. On April 20 Communist and United Nations officials began an exchange of POWs, and 6 days later, resumed the sessions at Panmunjom.
