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Contact Info
Home Town Cleveland, Ohio
Last Address Fairfax, Virginia
Date of Passing Jul 10, 1979
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
'"ANYONE HAVING EXPERIENCED VIETNAM (OR HAVING READ IT'S EXTENSIVE LITERATURE) SHOULD REALIZE THAT GENERAL LAVELLE AND MANY OTHERS WERE THRUST INTO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT TESTED THEIR MANHOOD. GENERAL LAVELLE'S MISFORTUNE WAS THAT HE WAS NOT SERVING UNDER NAPOLEAN,WHO ON NOVEMBER 2,1809 WROTE TO MARSHAL JEAN-BAPTISTE BESSIERES:" BE FIRM OF CHARACTER AND WILL...OVERCOME ALL OBSTACLES. I WILL DISAPPROVE YOUR ACTIONS ONLY IF THEY ARE FAINTHEARTED AND IRRESOLUTE. EVERYTHING THAT IS VIGOROUS,FIRM, AND DISCREET WILL MEET WITH MY APPROVAL." I SUPPOSE THE GENERAL WASN'T "DISCREET" ENOUGH AND THEREFORE HAD TO TAKE THE FALL."
Other Comments:
Gen Lavelle was probably the most controversial USAF officer during the Vietnam war. He was relieved of command of the 7th Air Force for ignoring the established Rules of Engagement.
He was retired as a Major General, but was later elevated to Lt General and his marker at Arlington says "General".
I was in Vietnam during his tenure as commander of 7th AF and it is my opinion that his actions saved American servicemen's lives. Later revelations actually clear his name and tapes released by the Nixon Library attest to the fact that the actions of Gen Lavelle were known of and approved by the administration. As with most of the war in Vietnam, his removal was a political action.
I knew his daughter Patti(Patty) in Germany and had the pleasure of meeting the General.
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Honor restored for general blamed after Nixon denied authorizing Vietnam bombing
John Lavelle, right, talks with Senate Armed Services Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) in late 1972. (AP Wirephoto)
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, August 5, 2010
During the summer of 1972, official Washington was dragging Air Force Gen. John D. Lavelle's name and reputation through the mud. Multiple investigations by the Pentagon and Congress concluded that the four-star commander had ordered unauthorized bombing missions in North Vietnam and then tried to cover them up. He was demoted to major general and forced to retire, in disgrace.
Lavelle maintained his rectitude until his death, saying he was acting on orders. Nearly four decades later, it turns out he was right.
On Wednesday, after an exhaustive reexamination of Lavelle's actions, President Obama asked the Senate to restore his honor and his missing stars. The decision officially sets the record straight about who really lied during the controversial chapter in the Vietnam War, who told the truth and who was left holding the bag.
Historical records unearthed by two biographers who came across the material by happenstance show that Lavelle was indeed acting on orders to conduct the bombing missions and that the orders came from the commander in chief himself: President Richard M. Nixon.
"I just don't want him to be made a goat, goddamnit," Nixon told his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, on June 14, 1972, a few days after it was disclosed that Lavelle had been demoted for the allegedly unauthorized attacks. "You, you destroy a man's career. . . . Can we do anything now to stop this damn thing?"
On June 26, Nixon's conscience intervened in another conversation with Kissinger. "Frankly, Henry, I don't feel right about our pushing him into this thing and then, and then giving him a bad rap," the president said. "I don't want to hurt an innocent man."
But Nixon was unwilling to stand up publicly for the general. With many lawmakers and voters already uneasy about the war, he wasn't about to admit that he had secretly given permission to escalate bombing in North Vietnam. At a June 29 news conference, he was asked about Lavelle's case and the airstrikes...
Korean War/Third Korean Winter (1952-53)
From Month/Year
December / 1952
To Month/Year
April / 1953
Description The military stalemate continued throughout the winter of 1952-1953. Allied Sabrejet pilots, meantime, persisted in destroying MiGs at a decidedly favorable ratio. In December the Communists developed an ambush tactic against F-86 pilots patroling along the Yalu River: MiG pilots would catch the UN aircraft as they ran short of fuel and headed south to return to base. During these engagements, some of the F-84 pilots exhausted their fuel and had IO bail out over Cho-do Island, 60 miles southwest of Pyongyang.
United Nations forces held the island and maintained an air rescue detachment there for such emergencies. To avoid combat while low on fuel, Sabre pilots began to fly home over the Yellow Sea. MiG pilots at this time generally sought the advantages of altitude, speed, position, and numbers before engaging in aerial combat. The UN pilots, on the other hand, relied on their skills to achieve aerial victories, even though they were outnumbered and flying aircraft that did not quite match the flight capabilities of the MiG-15s.
One memorable battle occurred on February l8, 1953, near the Sui-ho Reservoir on the Yalu River, 110 miles north of Pyongyang; 4 F-86Fs attacked 48 MiGs, shot down 2, and caused 2 others to crash while taking evasive action. All 4 U.S. aircraft returned safely to their base. While the Fifth Air Force maintained air superiority over North Korea during daylight hours, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command on nighttime missions ran afoul of increasingly effective Communist interceptors. The aging B- 29s relied on darkness and electronic jamming for protection from both interceptors and antiaircraft gunfire, but the Communists used spotter aircraft and searchlights to reveal bombers to enemy gun crews and fighter-interceptor pilots.
As B-29 losses mounted in late 1952, the Bomber Command compressed bomber formations to shorten the time over targets and increase the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures. The Fifth Air Force joined the Navy and Marines to provide fighter escorts to intercept enemy aircraft before they could attack the B-29s. Bomber Command also restricted.missions along the Yalu to cloudy, dark nights because on clear nights contrails gave away the bombers' positions. FEAF lost no more B-29s after January 1953, although it continued its missions against industrial targets. On March 5 the B-29s penetrated deep into enemy territory to bomb a target at Chongjin in northeastern Korea, only 63 miles from the Soviet border. While Bomber Command struck industrial targets throughout North Korea during the winter of 1952-1953, the Fifth Air Force cooperated with the U.S. Navy's airmen in attacks on supplies, equipment, and troops near the from fines.
In December 1952 the Eighth Army moved its bombline from 10,000 to 3,000 meters from the front lines, enabling Fifth Air Force and naval fighter-bombers to target areas closer to American positions. Beyond the front lines, the Fifth Air Force focused on destroying railroads and bridges, allowing B-26s to bomb stalled vehicles. In January 1953 the Fifth Air Force attempted to cut the 5 railroad bridges over the Chongchon Estoary near Sinanju, 40 miles north of Pyongyang. Expecting trains to back up in marshaling yards at Sinanju, Bomber Command sent B-29s at night to bomb them, but these operations hindered enemy transportation only briefly.
As the ground thawed in the spring, however, the Communist forces had greater difficulty moving supplies and reinforcements in the face of the Fifth Air Force's relentless attacks on transportation. At the end of March 1953, the Chinese Communist government indicated its willingness to exchange injured and ill prisoners of war and discuss terms for a cease-fire in Korea. On April 20 Communist and United Nations officials began an exchange of POWs, and 6 days later, resumed the sessions at Panmunjom.
