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A3C Michael Bell (Unit Historian)
to remember
Eaton, Curtis Abbot, Col.
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Col. Curtis Eaton enlisted in the Army on 4 June 1943 at Providence, RI, as a private. He was lost while on a mission over North Vietnam aboard his F-105 *tail number 59-1763). He remains, MIA.
SYNOPSIS::. . .
On 14 August 1966, then Major Curtis A. Eaton departed Takhli Airbase as the #4 aircraft (serial # 59-1763) in a flight of four that was participating in a major afternoon strike package against the Thai Nguyen Petroleum/Oil/Lubricant (POL) storage sites located around the town approximately 30 miles due north of Hanoi. The strike package was comprised of several flights of 4 aircraft each that originated from Korat and Takhli Airbases. Major Eatons flight was the second flight in the strike package.
Once in the target area, each flight leader checked in with the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control (ABCCC) aircraft who provided each flight with current target information. The first flight was directed onto its target at roughly 1500 hours. 20 minutes later Major Eatons flight was cleared in to attack its designated POL site.
As the flight pulled off target, Major Eaton climbed for altitude as he established radio contact with the flight leader reporting he had been hit by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire and was on fire. Shortly thereafter he radioed again stating he was ejecting from his crippled aircraft. Other flight members noted that the Thunderchief was last seen descending in a gradual right turn. In the chaos of aerial combat, none of the other pilots saw Curtis Eaton eject his aircraft nor did they spot a parachute in the air. Likewise, none of them observed the aircraft impact the ground.
The location of loss was over a forested and populated sector of north-central North Vietnam on the southern edge of rugged mountains with a valley covered in rice fields just to the south. The Song Deo Voi River ran west through the valley just south of where Major Eaton was downed. The location was also 1 mile north of Highway 13A, 22 miles northwest of Thai Nguyen and 47 miles northwest of Hanoi.
A visual and electronic search was immediately coordinated by the ABCCC utilizing aircraft already in the area. However, none of the pilots saw any sign of Major Eaton nor did they hear an emergency beeper emanating from the forest below. Because the area of loss was under total enemy control, no formal search and rescue was undertaken...
Source: Compiled by P.O.W. NETWORK from one or more of the following: raw
data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA
families, published sources, interviews and CACCF = Combined Action
Combat Casualty File.
Other Comments:
This Veteran has an (IMO) In Memory Of Headstone in Courts of the Missing at the Honolulu Memorial, Hawaii and Riverside Cemetery, South Kingstown, Washington County, Rhode Island
Description The military stalemate continued throughout the winter of 1952-1953. Allied Sabrejet pilots, meantime, persisted in destroying MiGs at a decidedly favorable ratio. In December the Communists developed an ambush tactic against F-86 pilots patroling along the Yalu River: MiG pilots would catch the UN aircraft as they ran short of fuel and headed south to return to base. During these engagements, some of the F-84 pilots exhausted their fuel and had IO bail out over Cho-do Island, 60 miles southwest of Pyongyang.
United Nations forces held the island and maintained an air rescue detachment there for such emergencies. To avoid combat while low on fuel, Sabre pilots began to fly home over the Yellow Sea. MiG pilots at this time generally sought the advantages of altitude, speed, position, and numbers before engaging in aerial combat. The UN pilots, on the other hand, relied on their skills to achieve aerial victories, even though they were outnumbered and flying aircraft that did not quite match the flight capabilities of the MiG-15s.
One memorable battle occurred on February l8, 1953, near the Sui-ho Reservoir on the Yalu River, 110 miles north of Pyongyang; 4 F-86Fs attacked 48 MiGs, shot down 2, and caused 2 others to crash while taking evasive action. All 4 U.S. aircraft returned safely to their base. While the Fifth Air Force maintained air superiority over North Korea during daylight hours, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command on nighttime missions ran afoul of increasingly effective Communist interceptors. The aging B- 29s relied on darkness and electronic jamming for protection from both interceptors and antiaircraft gunfire, but the Communists used spotter aircraft and searchlights to reveal bombers to enemy gun crews and fighter-interceptor pilots.
As B-29 losses mounted in late 1952, the Bomber Command compressed bomber formations to shorten the time over targets and increase the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures. The Fifth Air Force joined the Navy and Marines to provide fighter escorts to intercept enemy aircraft before they could attack the B-29s. Bomber Command also restricted.missions along the Yalu to cloudy, dark nights because on clear nights contrails gave away the bombers' positions. FEAF lost no more B-29s after January 1953, although it continued its missions against industrial targets. On March 5 the B-29s penetrated deep into enemy territory to bomb a target at Chongjin in northeastern Korea, only 63 miles from the Soviet border. While Bomber Command struck industrial targets throughout North Korea during the winter of 1952-1953, the Fifth Air Force cooperated with the U.S. Navy's airmen in attacks on supplies, equipment, and troops near the from fines.
In December 1952 the Eighth Army moved its bombline from 10,000 to 3,000 meters from the front lines, enabling Fifth Air Force and naval fighter-bombers to target areas closer to American positions. Beyond the front lines, the Fifth Air Force focused on destroying railroads and bridges, allowing B-26s to bomb stalled vehicles. In January 1953 the Fifth Air Force attempted to cut the 5 railroad bridges over the Chongchon Estoary near Sinanju, 40 miles north of Pyongyang. Expecting trains to back up in marshaling yards at Sinanju, Bomber Command sent B-29s at night to bomb them, but these operations hindered enemy transportation only briefly.
As the ground thawed in the spring, however, the Communist forces had greater difficulty moving supplies and reinforcements in the face of the Fifth Air Force's relentless attacks on transportation. At the end of March 1953, the Chinese Communist government indicated its willingness to exchange injured and ill prisoners of war and discuss terms for a cease-fire in Korea. On April 20 Communist and United Nations officials began an exchange of POWs, and 6 days later, resumed the sessions at Panmunjom.