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AB Raymond Guinn
to remember
Baker, David Hodge, Maj Gen USAF(Ret).
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Contact Info
Home Town Paterson
Last Address Naples, Florida
Date of Passing Feb 03, 2003
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
Description The new UN strategy sought to increase military pressure on North Korea and thus force the Communist negotiators to
temper their demands. In May 1952 the Fifth Air Force shifted from interdiction missions against transportation networks to attacks on North Korean supply depots and industrial targets. On May 8 UN fighter-bombers blasted a supply depot and a week later destroyed a vehicle repair factory at Tang-dong, a few miles north of Pyongyang. The Fifth Air Force, under a new Commander, Maj. Gen. Glen O. Barcus, also destroyed munitions factories and a steelfabricating plant during May and June. Meanwhile, Gen. Mark W. Clark took over the United Nations Command.
Beginning on June 23, U.S. Navy and Fifth Air Force units made coordinated attacks on the electric power complex at
Sui-ho Dam, on the Yalu River near Sinuiju, followed by strikes against the Chosin, Fusen, and Kyosen power plants,
all located midway between the Sea of Japan and the Manchurian border in northeastern Korea. The aerial reconnaissance function, always important in target selection, became indispensable to the strategy of increased aerial bombardment, since target planners sought the most lucrative targets. One inviting target was the capital city of Pyongyang. It remained unscathed until July 11, when aircraft of the Seventh Fleet, the 1st Marine Air Wing, the Fifth Air Force. the British Navy, and the Republic of Korea Air Force struck military targets there. That night, following day-long attacks, the Far East Air Forces Bomber Command sent a flight of B-29s to bomb 8 targets. Post-strike assessments of Pyongyang showed considerable damage inflicted to command posts, supply dumps, factories, barracks, antiaircraft gun sites, and railroad facilities. The North Koreans subsequently upgraded their antiaircraft defenses, forcing UN fighter-bombers and light bombers (B-26s) to sacrifice accuracy and bomb from higher altitudes.
Allied air forces returned to Pyongyang again on August 29 and 30, destroying most of their assigned targets. In September the Fifth Air Force sent its aircraft against troop concentrations and barracks in northwest Korea while Bomber Command bombed similar targets near Hamhung in northeast Korea. Along the front lines, throughout the summer and fall of 1952, the FEAF joined the U.S. Navy and Marines to provide between 2,005 and 4,000 close air support sorties each month. For example, FEAF Bomber Command not only flew nighttime interdiction missions but also gave radar-directed close air support
(10,000 or more meters from friendly positions) at night to front-line troops under Communist attack.
During the daytime the Mustang (F-51) pilots flew preplanned and immediate close air support missions. The 315th Air Division also supported the ground forces, flying supplies and personnel into Korea and returning wounded, reassigned, and furloughed personnel to Japan. C-124s, more efficient on the long haul, carded personnel and cargo. C-47s provided tactical airlift to airfields near the front lines, and C-l 19s handled bulky cargo and airborne and airdrop operations.
During the summer of 1952, the 4th and 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wings replaced many of their F-86Es with moditied F-86Fs. The new Sabre aircraft had more powerful engines and improved leading wing edges which allowed them to match the aerial combat performance of the MiG-15 jet fighters of the North Korean and Chinese air forces. Even though the Communists had built up their air order of battle, they still tended to restrict their flights to MiG Alley and often avoided aerial combat with the F-86 pilots. By August and September, however, MiG pilots showed more initiative, and aerial engagements occurred almost daily. Even though the Communist pilots improved their tactics and proficiency, U.S. pilots destroyed many more MiGs,
achieving at the end of October a ratio of 8 enemy losses to every U.S. loss.
The Communists, in spite of the pressure of the air campaign, remained stubborn in the truce talks. On October 8, 1952, the UN negotiators at Panmunjom recessed the talks because the Chinese would not agree to nonforced* repatriation of prisoners of war. As winter set in, UN forces in Korea remained mired in the stalemated conflict.
