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Miller, Gerald, Maj USAF(Ret).
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Vietnam War/Defense Campaign (1965)/Operation Rolling Thunder I
From Month/Year
March / 1965
To Month/Year
June / 1965
Description 2 March 1965-2 November 1968. Operation Rolling Thunder was the title of a gradual and sustained US 2nd Air Division (later Seventh Air Force), US Navy, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) aerial bombardment campaign conducted against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 2 March 1965 until 2 November 1968, during the Vietnam War.
In an effort to convince the North Vietnamese government to abandon its support of the insurgency in South Vietnam, President Johnson began a new bombing campaign in March 1965, known as Operation Rolling Thunder.
Lasting from 2 March 1965 until 1 November 1968, Rolling Thunder was the longest bombing campaign in United States history. It involved tactical aviation assets from the 7th Air Force in Thailand and South Vietnam, as well as aircraft from 7th Fleet and Marine Corps assets.
The campaign was marred by disputes between senior military leaders and the civilian administration from the outset. Military leaders argued for decisive strikes in order to isolate North Vietnam and to destroy their production capabilities and transportation systems.
President Johnson and Secretary McNamara sought the graduated use of force, choosing a cycle of bombing halts followed by escalation in an effort to persuade the North Vietnamese to negotiate for peace with the United States and South Vietnam.
During the three years of Rolling Thunder, Johnson and McNamara instituted seven bombing halts.
The three basic objectives of Operation Rolling Thunder under the Johnson administration were:
Strategically deter North Vietnam from supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam;
Raise the morale of military and political elites in South Vietnam;
Interdict North Vietnam’s support of the communist insurgency in the South.
Johnson and his staff continually sought a middle ground that would demonstrate American resolve without raising the ire of the international community. Ironically, by seeking this middle ground, the administration guaranteed that Rolling Thunder would fail to meet any of its objectives.
Rolling Thunder went through five phases.
During Phase I, from March to June 1965, a variety of targets were struck in an attempt to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate for peace. The air strikes served little purpose, other than to harden the resolve of North Vietnam and to solidify the sanctity of their cause. Most importantly, it led to the creation of the world’s most complex and lethal air defense networks.
Phase II from July 1965 to January 1966 was primarily an interdiction campaign aimed at roads, bridges, boats, and railroads. These attacks destroyed an estimated 4,600 trucks, 4,700 boats, and 800 railroad cars. At the urging of Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC, the focus of Rolling Thunder shifted from interdiction to petroleum products.
Admiral Sharp realized that the interdiction campaign was not achieving the desired results and believed that by focusing the campaign on energy resources, North Vietnam might be forced to negotiate for peace.
Phase III from January to October 1966, focused on North Vietnam’s petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) resources. Before this phase began, North Vietnam required only 32,000 tons of oil a year to supply their needs. By the time Rolling Thunder began to target POL resources, North Vietnam had 60,000 tons of POL stocks in reserve.
While the attacks destroyed an estimated 70 percent of the North Vietnamese supply, the North dispersed the remaining stock in fifty-five gallon barrels throughout the country. This proved more than adequate to supply the infantry and guerrilla forces fighting in South Vietnam and did little to affect the war in South Vietnam.
Phase IV from October 1966 to May 1967, concentrated the campaign’s efforts on the industry and power-generating capabilities of North Vietnam. For the first time, targets in Hanoi were struck, but as with Phase III the new tactics failed to have much impact on a non-industrialized country. Because North Vietnam’s ports still remained off limits, the strikes did not impede North Vietnamese ability to receive and distribute supplies destined for South Vietnam.
Phase V, the final phase, from May 1967 to October 1968, concentrated on isolating Hanoi from Haiphong, and both cities from the remainder of the country, as well as the destruction of remaining industrial infrastructure. United States aircraft averaged over 13,000 sorties a month and destroyed over 5,600 trucks, 2,500 rail cars, and 11,500 boats during this final phase of Rolling Thunder.
As during earlier phases, the North Vietnamese air defense network grew. By 1967, pilots confronted the most comprehensive air defense network in the world. North Vietnam fired over 25,000 tons of AAA ammunition from 10,000 anti-aircraft guns and hundreds of missiles from over twenty-five SAM battalions during any given month of 1967.
My Participation in This Battle or Operation
From Month/Year
March / 1965
To Month/Year
June / 1965
Last Updated: Mar 16, 2020
Personal Memories
Memories The third Distinguished Fly Cross (DFC) I received was for the following mission. I also received another two Air Medals for the 52 missions I flew during this tour. The Hq 7th AF policy was to "frag" (schedule) targets to be bombed until BDA photos confirmed the target was indeed destroyed. As such, several targets were bombed needlessly a second time when the recce aircraft could not complete the photo mission. Such was the case on November 5, 1966. A particularly nasty target, the Bac Ninh Bridge, just east of Hanoi, had been targeted for the second time. The F-105 bomber Sqadron C.O. swore to the 7th AF Operations that the bridge was destroyed the previous day. No photos, no good! That previous day, two RF-101's had launched to BDA the bridge, but ran into heavy ground fire and SAM missiles. One Voodoo was shot down, the pilot KIA. The other Voodoo returned home with battle damage. That night, an RF-4C night photo aircraft was also shot down attempting to photo the bridge. So, when his pleas were ignored by 7th AF, the '105 Squadron C.O. called the '101 Squadron C.O. and asked for his help. It was agreed, just between the two Squadron C.O.'s, another attempt would be made to BDA the bridge. I was the "standby pilot" that day. I had 98 "counter" missions and the policy was only "soft" targets for the last two missions. The C.O. asked if I would go and I replied, "if I can choose my wingman." That was good and I chose Capt. Sandy Sisco. We launched with in the hour, flew east over the Gulf of Tonkin, entered NVA north of Haiphong, flew VERY low level (20' - 50') at 540kts until about 5 miles from the bridge. We then "lit" the afterburners and "popped up" (climbed rapidly) to 15,000'. I concentrated on photographing the bridge and Sandy flew a "weaving left and right, up and down pattern over me to confuse the AAA radar. In doing so, Sandy took a photo of me photographing the bridge. It was indeed destroyed.
When we made our exit and called in our mission report "bridge destroyed" we were told to join the standby air refueling tanker, get some fuel and take the film directly to 7th AF in Saigon. It seems the '105 Squadron C.O. had told 7th AF Operations, "I'm not sending my guys back to that destroyed bridge." 7th then replied something to the effect, "then get down her and explain that to the 'ole man." Needless to say, the '105 Squadron C.O. was glad to see us.
As a footnote, there were 34 RF-101's lost to enemy ground fire from August 14, 1962 through August 7th, 1968. (This includes "suspected" 22 SAM 2 missiles and one MIG shoot down. One '101 was lost on the ground in Saigon to a mortar attack.) Nine pilots were rescued, 2 recovered (crash landed), eleven pilots were POW, with two "died in captivity" and eleven pilots were KIA. There were nine '101's lost in theater due to "operational activities" from July 1, 1965 to March 9, 1968.