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SSgt Robert Bruce McClelland, Jr.
to remember
Bryan, William Elmer, Jr., Maj Gen USAF(Ret).
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Contact Info
Home Town Flint, Michigan
Last Address Ocean Springs, Mississippi
Date of Passing Apr 06, 2008
Location of Interment Arlington National Cemetery (VLM) - Arlington, Virginia
During WWII, he destroyed 7.5 enemy aircraft in aerial combat plus 1 damaged and 2 destroyed on the ground.
A glitch in the system shows his Air Medals incorrectly. His correct total is 24.
The President of the United States of America, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Major William E. Bryan, Jr., United States Air Force, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving as Pilot with the 12th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, 19th Fighter Bomb Group, FIFTH Air Force, in action against enemy forces in the Republic of Korea during the period 1 through 21 February 1951. Displaying superb leadership, dauntless courage, and exceptional aeronautical skill, Major Bryan led his squadron of F-51 fighter aircraft on attacks against enemy transportation facilities and materiel. With total disregard for his personal safety, and ignoring the perils of enemy anti-aircraft, automatic weapons, and small-arms fire, Major Bryan repeatedly flew over hazardous mountain terrain at low speed and minimum altitude in search of camouflaged enemy vehicles and supplies. During this period, Major Bryan personally succeeded in detecting 82 vehicles which had been cleverly camouflaged by the enemy. Before destroying those targets, he led his flight in low level passes over the areas pointing out the camouflage techniques, and completely disregarded the damage frequently inflicted upon his own aircraft by enemy fire. As a direct result of this valuable instruction in camouflage detection, Major Bryan's squadron was able to locate 466 enemy vehicles of which 389 were totally destroyed and the remainder severely damaged.
General Orders: General Headquarters Far East Command: General Orders No. 103 (May 1, 1951)
Description This period was from January 22-July 7, 1968.
The air campaign in defense of Khe Sanh, an outpost held by the U.S. 26th Marine Regiment. began on January 22. 1968. For 2 and 1/2 months Allied tactical air forces continuously attacked targets surrounding the base and B-52s dropped bombs near Khe Sanh on an average of every 90 minutes. At night AC-47 gunships provided illumination and close air support. Air Force and Marine airlifters. mostly C-130s. frequently landed under fire at the Khe Sanh airstrip. bringing in supplies and reinforcements and flying out the wounded and refugees. When the transports could no longer land because of intense mortar and artillery fire. their crews used parachutes and arrester cables to extract cargo from the aircraft as they flew a few feet above the ground over the airstrip. Beginning on March 6 the Seventh Air Force provided fighter escorts to suppress enemy fire and lay down smoke screens until the C-130s dropped their cargoes. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, MACV Commander, encountered difficulties coordinating the air resources of the USAF and U.S. Marines to meet both the military demands at Khe Sanh and the requirements introduced by the Tet Offensive that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched on January 30, 1968. On March 8 he appointed the Seventh Air Force Commander. Gen. William W. Momyer, as Deputy Commander for Air Operations. MACV. to manage all tactical air resources in South Vietnam.
Late in March 1968 the North Vietnamese surrounding Khe Sanhmwithdrew. leaving only a single NVA division to oppose the Allied advance. On April 1, the 1st Marine regiment and the Army's 1st Cavalry Division moved along Route 9. relieving Khe Sanh 5 days later. On April 10. for the first time in 48 days. no shells fell on the base.
A week later, on April 19. the Allies mounted a helicopter-bome attack against A Shau Valley on the Laotian border. 30 miles south- west of Hue. The Viet Cong and NVA had built a vast stores and logistical base in this area since 1966. Preliminary USAF and Allied air strikes. including B-52 bombings between April 8 and 13, 1968. failed to clear the enemy from landing zones. In spite of the heavy resistance. on April 24, the U.S. Army seized the A Luoi airstrip at the northwest end of the valley. USAF transports airdropped supplies. often during bad weather and without tactical air support, because intense ground fire prevented the landing of C-130s until May 4. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese withdrew into Laos in mid-May, leaving behind large caches of weapons and supplies.
Earlier in the year. on January 30, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched the Tet (Buddhist New Year) Offensive throughout South Vietnam in an effort to regain the political and military initiative that they had held 2 years previously. At Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. alert base defenders successfully repulsed initial attacks, but in the next 2 weeks the air bases came under frequent mortar and rocket attacks; in all, the USAF lost 14 aircraft on the ground and another 114 damaged. During the Tet Offensive. Seventh Air Force pilots provided close air support for Allied troops. and C-7s and C-130s hauled ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements to isolated areas. Within 2 or 3 days Allied forces cleared the Viet Cong troops from all cities except Saigon and Hue. By February 5, the Allies had driven the Viet Cong from Saigon, although a large force remained in the vicinity. North Vietnamese forces that had taken the old imperial city of Hue were more difficult to dislodge. The Seventh Air Force used close air support carefully to avoid indiscriminate and unwanted damage in Hue; AC-130 gunships that could deliver precise fire day or night provided the most effective support. On February 25, Allied forces succeeded in driving the enemy from the city. Although
the Allies successfully and rapidly countered the Tet Offensive. the Communists gained a significant propaganda victory. Many Ameri- cans believed that a failure of U.S. military policy had permitted the Communists to mount so extensive a battle throughout South Vietnam.